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Emerging market currency crises have become a central debate issue in 
international finance since the early 1980s when many developing countries suffered 
from foreign debt crises and. high inflation. The currency crises literature focuses mainly 
on the reasons behind those crises and their severity. Emerging stock markets' (ESM) 
returns have become a central issue in international finance since the early 1990s when 
many developing countries completed their transition and adjustment from import-
substitution development strategies to export-led development strategies in various levels. 
As a result, capitalization, trading, return, risk, predictability, and integration of ESMs 
rose. Therefore, studies related to ESMs have increased since the early 1990s. The 
ESMs literature focuses mainly on the relationship between stock returns and related 
domestic and international (global) variables. 
Until the 1980s, many developing countries adopted import-substitution 
development strategies with high protection of domestic goods market, government 
control of public goods prices, exchange rates, capital movement controls, and interest 
rates. Following the first and second oil shocks in 1973 and 1979, many developing 
countries went into a foreign debt crisis betweens 1979-1983. At the same time, 
financing the huge budget deficit by printing money caused high inflation. 
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After the failure of import-substitution development strategies, most of the 
developing countries adopted export-led development strategies to respond to their 
economic problems. The great success of export-led development strategies in the East 
Asian countries encouraged them to launch compreherensive stabilization and structural 
adjustment programs. By the end of the 1990s, many developing countries had 
completed their transition and adjustment progress by adapting a major exchange rate 
devaluation and then by fixing or a crawling peg for their exchange rates to fight 
inflation, placing restrictions on central bank financing of the budget deficit, removing 
interest rate ceilings, price controls on public goods, quantity controls on imports, and 
restrictions on capital movements, etc. 
Empirical studies related to stock market returns can be divided into two groups. 
First, studies used the Granger causality test, the cointegration test, and variance 
autoregression models and focused on the relationship between stock market returns and 
selected macroeconomic variables, such as inflation or exchange rates (Malliaris and 
Urrutia, 1992; Habibullah and Baharumshah, 1996; Abdalla and Murinde, 1997; Nieh 
and Lee, 2001). Second, multifactor models used regression analysis and focused on the 
relationship between stock market returns and a variety of macroeconomic variables such 
as inflation rates, exchange rates, interest rates, industrial production, interest rate term 
structure, money supply, and oil prices etc to explain stock market returns. Also, some 
empirical studies used political risk factors and contagion effect as explanatory variables 
(Chen, Roll, and Ross, 1986; Kwon and Bacon, 1997; Bilson, Brailsford, and Hooper, 
2001; Perotti and Oijen, 2001). 
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There are two approaches in the literature to explain the determinants of currency 
cnses. The first-generation model was developed by Krugman (1979) and extended by 
Flood and Garber (1984) in response to currency crises in developing countries in the 
1980s. According to the first-generation currency crises model, expansionary fiscal and 
monetary policies are inconsistent with fixed exchange rate policies. When the fiscal 
deficit is financed by expansion of domestic credit, reserves decrease to defend the fixed 
exchange rate and significant loss of reserves forces the authorities either to devalue or 
float the domestic currency. 
Second-generation models are due to Obstfeld (1986) and later extended by him 
(1994, 1996) to respond to currency crises when the fundamentals of an economy were 
sound, as in the 1990s. According to second-generation models, changes in the 
government's objective function change agents' expectation and trigger currency crises. 
In Obstfeld's (1994, 1996) model, the government favors lower unemployment and 
higher output: hence when the costs of defending the peg (such as higher interest rates, 
higher unemployment, lower growth) are more than the benefit of defending the peg 
(such as gaining credibility and lower inflation) the government devalues even if 
macroeconomic fundamentals such as foreign debt, budget deficit, reserves etc are sound. 
There are a lot of studies related to the relationship between stock market returns 
and macroeconomic variables in developed economies. There are few studies related to 
the relationship between stock market returns and macroeconomic variables in emerging 
economies. Earlier studies did not focus on emerging stock markets until the 1990's for 
the following reasons: lack of data, lower capitalization and trading, fixed exchange rates, 
capital controls, ceiling on interest rates, trade controls, and so on. 
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Perotti and Oijen (2001) report that, according to the International Financial 
Corporation, the aggregate market capitalization in emerging markets increased 445 %, 
from US$488 billion in 1988 to US$2.225 Trillions in 1996 and trading in emerging 
markets increased 3 85 %, from US$411 billion to US$ l .5 86 Trillions in the same period. 
Also, foreign investment in the emerging stock markets has increased since 1990. 
Although there are theoretical and empirical studies related to the macroeconomic 
determinants of currency crises, there is no single theoretical and empirical study related 
t~;;~~~~~!!~~£~~7 
Patel and Sarkar (1998) divided stock market crises in three categories: The first 
were the stock market crises in developed markets: the 1973-74 crisis, the 1980-81 crisis, 
and the crisis of 1987. Secondly, there were the stock market crises in Asian markets: the 
1979-80 crisis, the 1990 crisis, and the crisis of 1996. The last were the stock market 
crises in Latin American markets: the 1980-81 crises, the 1986-87 crisis, and the crisis of 
1994-95. Also, we can include following crises: the 1998 Russian crisis, the 2001 
Turkish crisis, and the 2002 Argentina crisis. If we observe the timing of stock market 
crises and currency crises, we can conclude that currency crises and stock market crises 
occurred at the same time or appeared closely timed in the last decade (Latin America 
1994, Asia 1997, Turkey 2001 etc). 
The main purpose of this study is 1of annne the potential linkages between stock 
market and currency crises and the macroeconomic determinants of stock market crises 
and currency crises in emerging market:) In so doing, this paper offers several 
contributions to the literature. First, this study focuses on the macroeconomic 
determinants of stock market crises rather than stock market returns in emerging markets. 
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CThis will be the first study to determine the macroeconomic determinant of stock market 
crises and estimate the probability of stock market cris3 Stock market crises are defined 
as a binary variable to estimate the probability of stock market crises. Second, currency 
crises are treated as an endogenous variable in the stock market crises model and stock 
market crises are treated as an endogenous variable in the currency crises model, because 
earlier empirical studies related to stock returns and exchange rates showed that there is a 
feedback system between stock prices and exchange rates. Third, we use the bivariate 
probit model estimation method to investigate existence of correlation between stock 
market crises and currency crises, using data from emerging economies. Finally, we use 
the simultaneous equation probit model estimation method to account for the 
simultaneous nature of the relationship and to see direct causality between stock market 
and currency crises. 
The organization of this paper is as follows: Section 2 reviews the links between 
the stock market crises and currency crises through the stock market returns and 
exchange rates. Section 3 reviews the literature on currency crises models. Section 4 
explains the definition of currency crises and stock market crises, specifies the stock 
market crises and currency crises models, and empirical methodology. Section 5 




THE LINK BETWEEN STOCK MARKET CRISES AND CURENCY CRISES 
THROUGH STOCK MARKET RETURNS AND EXCHANGE RATES 
Previous studies showed that stock market returns and currency crises are driven 
by a set of common factors (money supply, industrial production, political risk factor, 
capital inflows, inflation, contagion etc.). Therefore, both stock market returns and 
currency crises should simultaneously respond to changes in those common factors. In 
the last decade, many of the countries that have had currency crises have also had stock 
market crises around the time when they were experiencing problems in their foreign 
exchange market, with recent examples including Mexico 1994, Thailand 1997 and 
Turkey 2001. 
2.1 Influence of exchange rates on stock returns 
Most empirical studies argue that exchange rates would affect stock market 
returns through two channels. First, a depreciation of the domestic currency increases 
exports and decrease imports. An increase in export raises earning expectations of the 
domestic export firms, leading to increases in domestic export firms' stock prices. 
Therefore, export-dominated economies' stock market return increases while import-
dominated economies' stock market return decreases. Second, a depreciation of the 
domestic currency lowers returns on domestic currency-denominated assets relative to 
dollar-denominated assets. Therefore, investors will prefer dollar-denominated assets to 
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equity, which is a domestic currency-denominated asset. At the same time, exchange rate 
risk is priced factor for foreign investors in the stock market return model and a 
depreciation of the domestic currency causes foreign investment shifts from stock market 
to foreign currencies. As a result, a depreciation of domestic currency lowers stock 
prices and increases the probability of stock market crisis. 
Using the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT), Thorbecke (1994) showed that a trade 
deficit was a source of systematic risk in the US market for several reasons. First, the 
trade deficit is a sign that net exports from the US ( demand for US good) decreased and 
thus the earnings of US companies will decrease. Second, the trade deficit is a sign that 
demand for foreign goods increased (prices of foreign good increased) and caused 
inflatio. Therefore, an increase in the trade deficit will increase an investor's risk in 
holding stock causing stock prices to decrease. Using monthly data from January 1984 to 
December 1988, his result from multivariate autoregression and autoregressive-moving 
average models show the existence of exchange rate risk premium associated with trade 
deficits. 
In their two-country world model using perfect capital mobility, Ma and Kao 
(1990) claimed that the relationship between stock market prices and change in exchange 
rates depends on the direction of the foreign trade balance. Using monthly data from 
January 1973 to December 1983 for 6 major industrialized economies, they concluded 
that a depreciation ofthe domestic currency would increase stock prices in export-
dominated (trade surplus) economies and decrease stock prices in import-dominated 
(trade deficit) economies. 
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Using the Granger-Causality test based on the Bivariate Vector Autoregressive 
(BV AR) and Error Correction Model (ERM), Abdalla and Murinde (1997) investigated 
causality between stock prices and real effective exchange rates for India, Pakistan, 
Korea, and The Philippines. Their results, based on data from January 1985 to July 1994, 
showed that exchange rates Granger influenced stock prices in Korea, Pakistan and India 
while stock prices·Granger influenced exchange rates in the Philippines. 
Using a world market portfolio in the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), 
Solnik (1974) developed the International Capital Asset Pricing Model (ICAPM), which 
also includes international systematic risk ( exchange rate risk). In his model, the 
differences of risk-free assets rates available to investors from different countries 
represent exchange risk because of departures from Purchasing Power Parity. Using 
monthly data from March 1970 to December 1991, Dumas and Solnik (1995) examined 
the relationship between excess return on equity and currency holding for the US, the 
UK, Japan and Germany1• They found a significant relationship between excess return 
on equity and currency holding and concluded that ICAPM has more explanatory power 
than CAPM in the existence of foreign exchange risk premium. 
The Arbitrage Pricing Model (APM) explains systematic risks by consideration of 
several factors such as industrial production, changes in both the expected and 
unexpected component of inflation changes, and the term structure. In the international 
APM (IAPM), exchange rates may be risk factors because of the usage of common 
currency return in the model and also because of the imperfections in domestic and 
international capital markets, such as asymmetric information and transaction costs. In 
their multi-factor IAPM, Ferson and Harvey (1994) examined returns on 18 national 
1 Excess returns on equity and currency holdings are measured in a common currency, the U.S. dollar. 
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equity markets using monthly data from February 1970 to December 1989 with the 
following variables: world excess return, change in Eurodollar-Treasury yield, change in 
exchange rate, unexpected inflation rate, change in oil prices, real interest rate, and 
changes in industrial production2• Their result showed that the effect of world excess 
returns is significant and positive for all countries while exchange rate risk is significant 
and positive for 7 countries and significant and negative for the U.S. 
Aggarwal (1981) empirically examined the relationship between stock prices and 
exchange rates in the U.S. using monthly data from July 1974 to December 1978. His 
result showed that there is a significant and positive relationship between stock prices and 
both contemporaneous and lagged values of the weighted average dollar values. He 
argued that an increase in exchange rates will increase exporter firms' profit and then 
stock prices will increase. 
Jorion (1991) used the Chen, Roll, and Ross (1986) model to test the relationship 
between stock prices and exchange rates in 20 different industries in the U.S. using 
monthly data from January 1971 to December 1987. The results showed that there is a 
significant positive relationship between stock prices and exchange rate fluctuations in 
exports industries such as chemical and machinery while there is a significant negative 
relationship between stock prices and exchange rate fluctuations in import industries such 
as textiles and department stores. 
2.2 Influence of stock returns on exchange rates 
Even if most studies consider causality from exchange rates to stock prices, there 
are some studies that consider the inverse causality. Stock market returns would affect 
exchange rates through two channels. First, according to the portfolio approach to 
2 World excess return is defined as return on MSCI world equity index minus the U.S. Treasury bill rate. 
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exchange rate determination, decreasing stock prices decrease foreign portfolio inflows 
and increase foreign portfolio outflows, leading to lower demand for domestic currencies 
and depreciation of the exchange rates. In this approach, domestic stock prices affect 
domestic currencies' values through capital flows between countries. Second, according 
to the monetary approach to exchange rate determination, a decrease in stock prices 
lowers the domestic wealth of investors, leading to lower demand for domestic currencies 
and lower domestic interest rates. As a result of lower domestic interest rates, investors 
switch their funds from interest bearing domestic assets to foreign currency dominated 
assets, causing domestic currencies to depreciate. In this approach, domestic stock prices 
affect domestic currencies' values through a reallocation of wealth. As a result, a 
decrease in stock market return causes the depreciation of domestic currency and 
increases the probability of the currency crises. 
Bahmani-Oskooee and Sahrabian (1992) employed the Granger causality test to 
examine the relationship between stock prices and exchange rate changes. They found a 
dual casual relationship between two variables, at least in the short-run. A decrease in 
stock prices decreases the domestic wealth of investors, causing lower demand for 
domestic currencies and depreciation in the domestic currencies. At the same time, a 
depreciation in the domestic currencies decrease stock prices. 
Solnik (1987) claimed that the poor quality and measurement errors of 
macroeconomic data make estimation of the time series model of exchange rate very 
difficult Therefore, stock prices are a good proxy for change in economic activity, and 
reflect the available information about future economic activity and monetary policy. 
Therefore, instead of macroeconomic variables, he used stock prices as an explanatory 
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variable in exchange rate models with monthly and quarterly data for eight developed 
countries from July 1973 to December 1983. His result from multivariate regression 
model showed that there is a significant and negative relationship between the real 
exchange rate and real stock returns for all eight developed countries. 
Smith (1992) tested the effects of interest rate differentials on both foreign and 
domestic bonds, money supplies, government debts, current account surplus, and stock 
prices on exchange rates using quarterly data from 1974 to 1988 for the German Mark-
U.S. Dollar and Japanese Yen- U.S. Dollar .. His result showed that stock market returns 
have a stronger effect on exchange rates than government bonds and money stock and 
that there is a negative relationship between exchange rates and stock prices. 
, In their "signal approach models", Kaminksy, Lizondo and Reinhart (1997) found 
a positive relationship between stock prices and currency crises concluding that a sharp 
decline in stock market prices was one of the best predictors of currency crises. Also, 
Kaminksy and Reinhart (1999) found a positive relationship between stock prices and 
currency crises employing "signal approach models". 
We can reach several conclusions from the extant literature. First, there is a 
significant negative relationship between stock prices and exchange rates. Second, 
although most of the studies found causality from exchange rates to stock prices, there is 
feedback system and bi-directional causality between stock prices and exchange rates. 
2.3 Stock Market Returns and Selected Explanatory Variables 
Most of the explanatory variables in our model come from previous studies 
related to stock market returns. We assume that markets are partially integrated. 
Therefore, both internal (local) and external (global) variables may be important in 
11 
determining stock market crises. In the next section, we will explain the relationship 
between stock market returns and selected local and global explanatory variables. 
2.3.1. Stock Market Returns and Inflation 
Empirical studies generally found a negative relationship between inflation and 
stock market returns. A negative relationship between inflation and stock market returns 
has been explained by the proxy effect hypothesis, the monetization of the government 
debt and the decline in real wealth. 
Using the quantity theory of money, Fama (1981) concluded a negative 
relationship between real activity and inflation and a positive relationship between real 
activity and stock market returns would assure a negative relationship between stock 
market returns and inflation. This is called the proxy effect hypothesis. 
In the first step, he estimated monthly, quarterly and annual inflation rates using 
the "rational expectation" combination of money demand theory. Money base growth 
rate, and industrial production growth rate were used as explanatory variables and he 
found a positive relationship between money base growth rate and inflation, and a 
negative relationship between industrial production growth and inflation. Money demand 
theory says that given nominal money supply and the interest rate, an increase in real 
activity (industrial production growth), results in an increase in real money demand, 
which lowers price level. Therefore, a negative relationship between industrial 
production growth rate and inflation in regression analysis is consistent with the money 
demand model. 
In the second step, he estimated the change in the average real rate of return on 
the capital stock (DROCt) using Jongerson's "flexible accelerator" model. The model 
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says that as the general level of real activity increases, the average real rate ofreturn on 
the capital stock also increases. Industrial production growth rate, expected and 
unexpected inflation rates are used as explanatory variables to estimate the average real 
rate of return on capital stock. The regression results show that increases in industrial 
production growth rate and unexpected inflation rates increase the average real rate of 
return on capital stock while increases in expected inflation lower the average real rate of 
return on capital stock. 
In final step, he estimated the real stock return using seven different regression 
models. His results can be summarized, if only expected and unexpected inflation rates 
are included in the regression there are negative relationships between those variables and 
real stock market returns, as expected. When current and future industrial production 
growth rate and money base growth rate variables are added in regression, the 
explanatory power of model increased and all variables have the expected signs. Finally, 
when expected inflation and the current industrial production growth rate are dropped 
from regression, the explanatory power of model increased. It is clear that future 
industrial production growth rate has new information and its explanatory power on the 
real stock will be higher. He explained the negative relation between stock return and 
unexpected inflation by Franco Modigliani and Richard Cohn's hypothesis. 
Their hypothesis is that the stock market is irrational. Nominal discount 
The market to uses rates that vary directly with expected inflation 
price the real payoffs generates by equities. As a consequence, positive 
unexpected inflation, which implies higher future expected inflation in 
a world where expected inflation is approximately a random walk, 
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produces a decline in stock prices and a negative relation between stock 
return and unexpected inflation (Fama, 1981, p. 561) 
According to Geske and Roll (1983), the monetization of the government debt 
was the main reason behind the inverse relationship between stock market returns and 
inflation. They argued that a negative random real shock would lower corporate earnings 
and the government's tax revenue, while leaving government expenditures unchanged. 
As a result of those events, the government's deficit increases, resulting increased 
borrowing, leading to an increased monetary base, which ends in expected inflation 
increases and stock prices decrease. 
According to Stulz (1986), the decline in real wealth was the cause of the inverse 
relationship between stock returns and expected inflation. He argued that an increase in 
expected inflation would decrease the real wealth of households causing them to switch 
their portfolio from nominal assets, nominal bonds, and cash to real assets that will 
increase. This will decrease demand for nominal assets, nominal bonds and domestic 
currency, causing their prices to decrease. 
2.3.2. Stock market returns and Industrial Production 
Also, it is clear that an increase in real activity is a sign of a healthy economy that 
increases returns on stocks. Industrial production is a good proxy for real activity, 
especially when quarterly data for GDP are not available. A decrease in the growth rate 
of the industrial production decreases consumption and then firms' revenues and profit, 
which increases selling pressure on stocks. 
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2.3.3. Stock market returns and capital inflows 
The emerging economies attracted a large amount of foreign capital in the 1990s 
for the following reasons. First, capital account liberalization and privatization in 
emerging economies made investment possible, productive and provided new 
opportunities for foreign investors. Second, recession and low interest rates in developed 
countries made emerging economies more attractive for foreign investors. Third, foreign 
investors were protected from exchange rate risk by adoption of fixed exchange rate 
regimes. Fourth, technological innovations and investors' desire to diversify their risk 
increased capital inflows into emerging economies. 
The impact of capital inflows on the stock market depends on the causes behind 
capital flows, their composition, and the policy response of authorities. 
An increase in capital inflows increase the supply of foreign currency relative to 
domestic currency and the exchange rate tends to appreciate, which adversely affect the 
trade balance. Most of the emerging market economies adopts fixed exchange rates and 
therefore buy excess foreign currency selling the domestic currency which will increase 
domestic money supply, this decreases domestic interest rates and thus the relative return 
of stock market increases. Bond (1999) stated that the monetary authorities attempt to 
sterilize a capital inflow and may raise interest rate to attract more capital inflow. If 
government sterilizes (government selling bonds to decrease the money supply) capital 
inflows, interest rates will increase and increase in domestic interest rate will attract more 
capital inflows but also will lower the present value of firms and relative return of stocks. 
Therefore, the impact of capital inflows on stock market returns depends on the policy 
response of authorities. 
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The composition of capital inflows can have an impact on stock market returns 
through different channels. Equity investment goes directly into the stock market, which 
increases stock market return. Foreign direct investment will increase GDP and stock 
market return. Capital inflows through the banking system may stimulate economic 
growth and then stock market return. Also, Patnaik (1994) claimed that capital inflows 
through the banking system can create excess funds absence of sufficient demand for 
bank credits and the some portion of the excess funds can be channeled to stock market 
by banks, which will increase stock market return. 
Even if capital inflows have a positive effect on stock market return at least in the 
short-run, capital inflow reversals are inevitable in the long-run in emerging markets and 
a negative impact on stock market return. A sudden capital outflow can be linked to 
stock market returns in several ways. 
The financial sector is not highly developed in emerging economies; therefore 
capital inflows are generally short-term. Foreign investor's concern or fear about 
devaluation and expected stock market return can trigger capital inflow reversals and can 
lead to self-fulfilling stock market crashes. 
If a sudden capital outflow is not sterilized, the central bank action to defend a 
fixed exchange rate tightens the money supply. As a result of tight money supply, 
interest rates increase, which lower the relative price of stock. Also, an increase in the 
interest rate increases the cost of capital and reduces investment, which may cause a 
recession in the economy. Also, a decrease in the money supply because of an 
unsterilized capital outflow may force people to sell stocks to meet their excess money 
demand. 
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If there is a capital inflow reversal, countries can choose to increase domestic 
interest rates to stop the capital outflows. An increase in the domestic interest rates lower 
the relative stock market returns and investors prefer other assets to equity. 
If banks are heavily dependent on capital inflow, sudden capital inflow reversals 
can create solvency and liquidity problems in the banking sector, which can trigger a 
stock market crash as through banking stocks. 
2.3.4. Stock market returns and Regional Stock Market Returns 
The level of integration in emerging markets has increased since the 1990s. As a 
result, the contagion effect has been used as an explanatory variable in stock market 
returns models. The existence of contagion between stock markets is important to 
international investors for several reasons. First, if there is contagion between stock 
markets, investors cannot diversify their portfolios between different countries. Second, 
investors not only pay attention to domestic stock markets, but also to other stock 
markets in the region. Prior empirical studies used a world stock market index and 
regional stock market indexes as proxies for the contagion effect. 
According to Roll (1988), 19 of23 major stock markets declined more than 20 
percent during the 1987 stock market crash. He concluded that the trade deficit, the fear 
of recession, the market response to world movement ( decline in stock market return and 
increase in the U.S. interest rate) and institutional changes (margin rules and the absence 
of circuit breakers) caused the 1987 stock market crash. He found that the stock market 
crash began in the non-Japanese Asian markets, spread to a number of European stock 
markets, then to North American stock markets, and finally to Japan's stock market. 
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Malliaris and Urrutia (1992) claimed that the 1987 crash began simultaneously in 
all national stock markets. By using the Granger causality test, they examined the 
contemporaneous and the lead-lag relationship between six major stock markets for 
periods before, during, and after the 1987 market crash. Their results showed that the 
lead-lag relationship between national stock markets existed only during the crash period 
while the contemporaneous relationship between notional stock market existed periods 
before, during, and after. 
Patel and Sarkar (1998) empirically examined the behavior of individual country 
stock prices and regional stock market prices when the regions are in crisis. They found 
strong evidence of contagion within regions, most individual stock market prices sharply 
declined when region was in crisis. However, they did not find significant evidence of 
contagion across regions (crises did not spill over across regions). 
Bilson, Brailsford, and Hooper (2001) found contagion within regions, but not 
across regions. In their regression analysis, they the used return on regional stock market 
index and world stock market index as explanatory variables3• Their results show that 
return on regional market index is significant and positive in 12 of 20 markets while 
return on world market index is significant and positive in 3 of 20 markets. 
In this study, we use Bilson, Brailsford, and Hooper (2001) definition for the 
regional stock market index. 
3 "The regional index (RI) is an equally weighed index formed excluding that particular market's returns 
computed for each of Latin America, Asia and Europe." 
The world market index is the MSCI World Index. 
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2.3.5. Stock market returns and Global Variables 
Our global variables include the world stock market index and world output. It is 
clear that an increase in world stock market index and world output is a sign of a healthy 
global economy which has a positive effect on emerging market economies and stock 
returns. Harvey (1995) found that world inflation, world GDP and world oil prices have 
limited explanatory power to determine stock market returns in emerging market 
economies. 
In this study, different definitions for the world stock market index and world 
output are used to see how major developed economies' stock market and output affects 
emerging market stock returns. We constructed a world stock market index and world 
output for each emerging economies from three major developed countries, the U.S., 
Japan, Germany. For instance, the world stock market index (world output) for country 
A is a distance weighted average of the U.S., Japan and Germany's stock market index 
(output)4. 
2.5 Empirical Studies 
Chen, Roll, and Ross (1986) attempted to develop a stock market return model as 
a function of macroeconomic variables. Their model included monthly (MP) and annual 
(YP) changes in industrial production, unanticipated inflation rates (UI), changes in 
expected inflation (DEi), a risk premium (UPR), the term structure (UTS), consumption 
(CG), and oil prices (OG). 
4 It is clear that a decrease in distance between emerging market economies and selected developed 
economies will increase weight. For example, the weight of Japanese economy on Asian economies will 
be higher than the weight of Japanese economy on Latin American economies. 
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Their model for stock returns can be written as: 
R =a+ bMPMP + boEIDEI + brn UI + bUPR UPR + buTs UTS + e 
where a and e are constant and error terms, respectively. They estimated the model using 
monthly data for four different sample periods (1958-1984, 1958-1967, 1968-1977, and 
1978-1984). MP and UPR are significant over the full sample periods and have positive 
coefficients, as expected. UTS is marginally significant over the full sample periods and 
has negative coefficients, as expected. UTS showed differences between long-term real 
interest rates (return on long-term government bonds) and short-term real interest rates 
(Treasury-bill rate). When long-term real interest rates decrease, real return on any form 
of capital decreases and the relative return on stock return increases. Therefore, investors 
change the composition of their portfolios in favor of stocks. DEi and UI are only 
significant in the period from 1968-1977 and have negative coefficients. Consumption 
and oil prices were separately added in their model to test their effects on stock returns. 
The results showed that they are insignificant and neither has an effect on stock market 
returns. 
By using monthly data from January 1980 to December 1992, Kwon and Bacon 
(1997) tested whether macroeconomic variables have significant explanatory power for 
Korean stock market returns. 
They derive 22 indexes for the Korean stock market, by section, size, and 
industry. They conducted three different time series regression models for each index. In 
the first model, they applied Chen, Roll, and Ross' (1986). Unexpected inflation (UI), 
expected inflation (DEi), and risk premium (URP) are insignificant for all 22 indexes 
while term structure (UTS) is significant for nine of the 22 indexes, and the production 
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index (DPI) is only significant for two of the 22 indexes. Even if the results of the first 
regression model are consistent with the Chen, Roll, and Ross (1986) model, the results 
of the model can be improved by adding new variables. In the second model, they added 
the following explanatory variables: change in dividend yield (DDN), monthly trade 
balance (TRB), change in the foreign exchange rate (DEXCH), change in oil price 
(DOIL), and change in money supply (DMl). Dividend yield (DDN) is significant 
across all 22 indexes and has a negative coefficient. Change in foreign exchange rate 
(DEX CH) is significant for ten of 22 indexes and has a negative coefficient, as expected. 
The monthly trade balance (TRB), change in oil price (DOIL), and change in money 
supply (DMl) are insignificant for most of the 22 indexes. In the third model, they 
combined all variables from the first and second models. None of the variables (except 
term structure) show any significant difference from the previous models. Term structure 
(UTS) loses its explanatory power for most of the indexes. 
Bilson, Brailsford and Hooper (2001) attempted to determine the macroeconomic 
indicators of the stock market index in emerging markets by assuming partial integration 
of the local and global markets. It is clear that high (low) integration will increase the 
explanatory power of global (local) variables. Stock market returns can be formulated as 
a function of both global and local variables. Their regression model can be written as: 
,where Rit is the return for the country i at time t, and Rwt is the value-weighted world 
market index at time t. MSit-I and GPit-I denote the percentage change in the money 
supply variable and percentage change in the consumer price variable for country i at 
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time t-l, respectively. RAit-2 is the percentage change in real activity variable for country 
i at time t-2 and ERit is the percentage change in an exchange rate variable for country i 
at time t. 
Bilson, Brailsford and Hooper separately tested Equation (1.1) for 20 emerging 
market using the OLS procedure and monthly data from January 1985 to December 1997. 
Results show that the exchange rate variable is the most powerful explanatory 
macroeconomic variable in the model in terms of significance (in twelve countries) and 
sign of coefficient (mostly negative as expected from theory). The value of the world 
market index is positive and significant in ten markets. Money supply is positive and 
significant in five markets, whereas goods prices and real activity variables are only 
significant in one market. Most importantly, R2 values vary range from Oto 38 percent. 
Because of the poor results of the model, Equation (1.1) is extended by adding 
new macroeconomic ( country risk, trade sector, interest rates and a regional index) and 
microeconomic ( dividend yields and price-to-earning ratio) variables. The new model 
can be written as: 
Rit = C\'i + f3i Rwt + Oi MSit + ei GPit + 11 RAit + \ ERit + xi CRit + 'Y/i TSit + <pj IR.it + Kj Rlit 
(1.2) 
where CRit, TSit, IR.it, Rlit, PEit, and DYit are political risk, trade sector, interest rates, 
regional index, price-to-earning ratio, and dividend yield, respectively. 
Equation (1.2) is separately tested for 20 emerging markets using the OLS 
procedure and monthly data from February 1991 to December 1997. The results show 
that the price-to earnings-ratio is the best explanatory variable with positive significance 
in sixteen markets. The regional index variable is significant and positive in twelve 
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markets. Dividend yield is significant and negative in ten markets. The significance of 
the macroeconomics variables disappears in the new model and even if the exchange rate 
variable is significant in fourteen markets, six of them have positive coefficients, an 
unexpected result. Political risk, interest rates and trade sector variables are only 
significant in a few markets. 
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CHAPTER III 
LITERATURE REVIEW FOR CURRENCY CRISES 
After liberalization of the capital account, international portfolio investors began 
to inove funds among stock markets. There are two main risks for them; a decrease in the 
stock market and currency devaluation. When they expect a devaluation, they sell stock 
and buy foreign currency. These actions have two results. First, selling stocks decreases 
stock prices and secondly the demand for foreign reserves puts pressure on the authorities 
to devalue. The currency crisis variable is endogenous in our stock market crash model. 
Therefore, we need to specify the currency crisis model and use it to estimate unbiased 
and efficient estimates of the stock market crisis. 
3.1 First Generation Model 
Krugman (1979) developed a one-good, two asset, non-linear currency crisis 
model for a small open economy. Under a fixed exchange regime, the government has 
no control over budget deficit financing. The government budget deficit is financed by 
domestic credit creation; agents can trade domestic currency for foreign currency and 
reserves will decrease. The persistent loss of reserves initiate, speculative attacks against 
the currency and force the authorities to devalue. Because of the perfect foresight 
assumption, speculative attacks occur before international reserves are depleted to zero 
and the exchange rate jumps immediately. 
24 
Flood and Garber (1984) constructed a continuous-time, perfect foresight, linear 
currency crisis model for a small open economy. They developed the concept of a 
'shadow floating exchange rate' to calculate the timing of a regime collapse. The shadow 
floating exchange rate adjusts for money market equilibrium allowing a speculative 
attack when reserves are exhausted. fu this model, domestic credit grows at a constant 
rate, µ, and to maintain the money market equilibrium reserves decrease at a constant rate 
, µ. The government cannot support the fixed exchange rate forever with its finite 
reserves and when reserves reach a lower bound the exchange rate floats freely. The 
timing of the collapse depends on two market fundamentals: domestic credit growth and 
initial reserves. fucreases in domestic credit growth accelerate the collapse, while an 
increase in initial reserves postpones it. 
Flood and Garber's (1984) model has been extended in several ways. Flood, 
Garber and Kramer (1996) assume that the monetary authority sterilizes reserve losses by 
purchasing domestic government securities from the private sector so the monetary 
authority expands domestic credit and decreases domestic reserves. Therefore, 
speculative attacks do not change the money-market equilibrium but change the bond-
market equilibrium. They extend the first generation model by adding an explicit bond 
market to the interest rate equation in the speculative attack model. fu their model, an 
increase in domestic bond issues increases the interest rate differential and the probability 
of crisis will increase. 
Calvo and Mendoza (1996) argued that the 1994 Mexican peso crisis could be 
explained by a new flow imbalance model rather than by the classical stock imbalance 
famework. They showed that the large expansion ofM2, political instability, and short-
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term public debt with respect to reserves were the main reasons behind the 1994 Mexican 
peso crisis. In their explanation, huge capital inflows and increases in public 
expenditures caused the expansion of M2 and over expansion of central bank credit 
caused the public debt to increase. When capital flows out, expenditures decrease and 
agents refuse to roll over public debt, authorities do not have any choice but to devalue 
and to let the currency float freely. 
3.2 Second Generation Model 
Obstfeld (1994) showed in his two period models that If agents expect high 
inflation or their expectation about devaluation increase, they demand higher interest 
rates in the bond market and the cost of government debt ( cost of fixed exchange rate) 
increases. Therefore, an increase in agents' expectation about devaluation or higher 
inflation can lead to higher interest rates and increase the cost of government debt. Also, 
an increase in interest rates lower investments and output. In period two, the government 
has an advantage over agents because it can choose exchange rates and tax rates to 
minimize the objective (loss) function after observing agents' expectation. The 
government's choice to devalue or not depends on the interest rate in period 1 and the 
currency composition of government debt. It is clear that higher interest rates and higher 
domestic currency debt increase the government's social cost function and the 
government prefers to devalue instead of defending exchange rates. It is certain that 
devaluation has political risk and loss of credibility costs too. The lack of information of 
the agents about the government's decision can lead to multiple equilibria. 
Cole and Kehoe (1996) develope a self-fulfilling debt crisis model to explain 
better Mexico's 1994-1995 currency crisis; which occurred when Mexico had sound 
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fundamentals before the crisis. In their model, the initial level of government debt is 
critical. If the initial level of government debt is too low, the government can rollover its 
debt without selling new debt and lenders are not demand a risk premium on government 
debt. In this scenario, a crisis is avoidable. In the opposite scenario, if initial level of 
government debt is too high, the government cannot rollover it's debt and lenders are not 
demand any of the government debt at any low risk premium so the crisis is inevitable. A 
self-fulfilling debt crisis can occur stochastically between these two extreme crisis zone. 
They conclude that increasing government debt, the shortening of maturity of the 
government debt, and political instability were the main causes of Mexico's 1994-1995 
cns1s. 
Tomell (1999) argued that the sudden increase in interest rates could lead to a 
quick rise of banks' non-performing. The desire of the government to bail out these 
banks to prevent widespread banking problems increases fiscal deficits, therefore 
increasing the probability of a crisis. 
Ozkan and Sutherland (1995) developed a model to explain the 1992-1993 
European currency crises. In their model, given some degree of capital mobility and a 
fixed exchange rate, an increase in German interest rates may trigger a currency crisis in 
European currency markets by leading to higher domestic interest rates, a shortening of 
debts maturities, increasing costs of public debt, and decreasing output which raises the 
cost of fixed exchange rates and the probability of exchange rate regime changes. 
Flood and Marion (2000) introduced an endogenous currency risk premium into 
the first-generation currency crisis model to show that self-fulfilling currency crises may 
occur because of agent's changing beliefs about currency risk. The model was used to 
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explain the 1994 Mexican peso crisis by taking into account sterilization, debt-financed 
fiscal deficit and anticipatory price-setting behavior. They called their new model the 
"modified first-generation model" because their model is different from the first 
generation model in several aspects. First, the introduction of a risk premium in the 
interest parity condition makes the model nonlinear and multiple equilibria possible. 
Second, the fiscal deficit is :financed by issuing bonds rather than by printing money. 
Third, forward indexation is assumed for goods price setting. In this model, when an 
agent's expectation for speculative attack increases, they demand a higher risk premium 
and sell domestic currency denominated securities for foreign currency denominated one. 
The demand for switching decreases reserves and forces exchange rate devaluation or the 
free float of the currency. 
3.3 Currency Crises and Selected Explanatory Variables 
Most of the explanatory variables in our model come from previous studies 
related to currency crises. In the empirical work, there is no clear distinction between the 
first and second-generation model. Most of the previous empirical work uses variables 
from both theoretical models. 
3.3.1 Currency crises and M2 I Reserves 
Foreign exchange reserves are an indicator of the government's ability to finance 
its current account deficit, when the country has a fixed exchange rate. Large foreign 
reserves relative to M2 show a governments' sustainability of the current account deficit 
and decrease the probability of a currency crises. To compare the international reserves 
among the countries, the ratio of money supply (M2) to international reserves is used as a 
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scale variable and a low ratio of money supply (M2) to reserves may decrease the 
likelihood of a currency crisis. 
3.3.2 Currency crises and Short Term External Debt to Reserves 
As we saw in Flood and Marion's (2000) model, the uncovered interest parity 
condition no longer holds because of the introduction of a risk premium in the interest 
parity condition. We can use the short-term external debt to reserves ratio as a proxy for 
the risk premium. When the short-term external debt to reserves ratio increases, foreign 
creditors' doubts about the country's commitment to rollover its short-term liabilities 
increase. Countries can face difficulties finding new foreign debt to rollover their 
existing debt and the probability of currency crises may increase. Sachs and Radelet 
(1998) state that increases in the ratio of the short-term debt as a percentage of the 
international reserves may trigger panic for foreign investors and countries can face 
difficulties rolling over their short-tern debt obligations. 
3.3.3 Currency crises and Real Exchange Rate Overvaluation 
The real exchange rate overvaluation increases the risk of currency crisis by 
decreasing competitiveness of countries and worsening the current account. An increase 
in the current account deficit decreases a country's ability to generate external revenue to 
finance a balance of payments crisis. Therefore, overvalued exchange rates may lead to 
the expectation that a large devaluation will occur. 
3.3.4 Currency crises and Political Stability 
It is clear that increased political instability introduces uncertainty into markets 
and causes investors' to lose of confidence. First, investors want to make sure that 
governments will not change the existing peg after they have made a investment decision. 
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Second, investors want to make sure that governments will not change their economic 
plans for short-term political gains. 
Block (2003) used a broad range of political variables (Election dummy, Right-
wing government dummy, Democracy, Majority) and found that right-wing government, 
democracy and strong government (Majority) decrease the probability of currency crises 
in emerging markets5• He concluded that an unstable political situation may cause 
agents' loss of confidence and trigger a speculative currency attack. During elections, 
governments are more willing to increase fiscal expenses to win elections. Fiscal 
expenditures are primarily financed by monetary expansion and pressure on domestic 
currency increase. A stable government gives more confidence to the investor. Past 
experiences in developing countries show that coalition parties have different economic 
objectives, targets and problems between coalition parties are inevitable, which can give 
mixed signals to investors. In our study, a political risk variable is obtained from 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). 
3.3.5 Currency crises and Current Account 
The current account balance is a good proxy to measure competitive pressure on 
the exchange rate. Increase in the current account deficit is a sign that a country is losing 
its competitive position. A large current account deficit is sustainable if economic 
growth is higher and expected to remain high. Therefore, an increase in the current 
account deficit to GDP ratio shows that a country's ability to sustain its current account 
deficit decreases and pressure to devalue increases. 
5 Block (2003) provides an excellent literature review about political stability and currency crises. 
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3.3.6 Currency crises and Inflation 
An increase in inflation rate can affect currency crisis through several channels. 
First, an increase in domestic inflation rate may be a sign of rapid growth in domestic 
credit ( seignorage) to finance budget deficits and the domestic currency tends to 
depreciate. Under a fixed exchange rate regime, the central bank does not have any 
alternative but to back domestic currency to prevent it from depreciating. In this case, the 
central bank has several options. It can sell foreign assets or domestic bonds to buy 
domestic currency. A decrease in reserves and an increase in domestic debt increases the 
probability of a currency collapse. Second, if the inflation level is relatively high and the 
exchange rate is fixed, the competitiveness of a country decreases and the cost of 
defending a fixed exchange rate increases. Therefore, the government may find not 
defending the exchange rate less costly and the government's unwillingness to defend the 
fixed exchange rate may trigger a speculative attack. At the same time, an increase in 
inflation increases interest rates and then the increase the cost of domestic denominated 
currency debt and investment. Therefore, the government prefers to devalue instead of 
defending a fixed exchange rate. 
3.3. 7 Currency crises and Contagion Effect 
A particular feature of the 1990s currency crises was the almost simultaneous 
depreciation of all exchange rates within a region. For instance, the devaluation of the 
Mexican peso in December 1994 was followed by devaluation in Argentina and other 
regional countries ( the Latin American crises of 1994-1995) and the devaluation of the 
Thai baht in July 1997 was followed by devaluation in Malaysia, Indonesia, South Korea 
and other Asian countries ( the Asian crises of 1997-1998). The spread of the December 
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1994 Mexican and July 1997 Asian currency crises has raised questions about how a 
currency crisis in one country affects other countries and how to measure those effects. 
Unfortunately, there is no consensus about how currency crises were transmitted from 
one country to another and previous studies have used several different definitions of 
contagion. 
In their empirical study, Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1996) defined 
contagion as a dummy variable. If at least one other country in the same region has had a 
currency crisis in the current or previous year, the variable takes value of one, otherwise 
zero. In their probit model, they found a positive and significant relationship between 
currency crises and the contagion dummy variable. They explained the contagion effect 
. with trade linkages and herd behavior6. 
Fratzscher (2002) focused on the role of contagion in currency crises in emerging 
markets during the 1990s. His study showed that currency crises in one country can 
spread to other countries trough three types of channels: trade linkages, bank lending 
competition and stock market integration. The bank lending competition theory says that 
if countries have common lenders, banks ( common lenders) are not only withdrawing 
their funds from the country in crisis but also from other countries 7. Stock market 
integration theory says that if the correlation of stock market returns across emerging 
markets is high, then losses in one equity market may cause a withdrawal from other 
equity markets. He defines three continuous contagion variables: trade contagion, bank 
6 Trade linkages theory say that if country A and B have a large degree bilateral trade or country A and B 
compete for third markets then a devaluation in country A will lower competitiveness of country B and 
increase pressure to devalue. Herd behavior theory says that if country A has a currency crisis, 
international investors are not only withdrawing their funds from country A, but also from other countries. 
7 Caramazza, Ricci and Salgado (2000) 
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contagion and stock market contagion8• His models with all three continuous contagion 
variables perform very well in predicting the crises. 
We will use a new approach to identify contagion affects in the regions. In this 
approach, we will construct a regional market pressure index (RMPI). RMPI is an 
equally weighted average index formed by excluding a particular country's market 
pressure index (MPI) computed for each of Latin America, Asia and Europe9• For 
instance, RMPI for Argentina is an equally weighted average of MPis in Latin American 
countries excluding Argentina. In this way, we can test empirically how an increase in 
RMPI will affect the other countries in the region. Our continuous contagion variable 
can explain trade linkages and herd behavior channels. 
3.4 Empirical Studies 
Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1997) divided previous studies into two groups. 
First, individual country studies used a few crisis indicators and focused on the one-step-
ahead probability of regime change.10 Second, a large number of country studies from a 
variety of economic and financial systems u&ed a large number of crisis indicators. Some 
focused on an indicator of currency crises without conducting any formal test11 and, some 
8 Trade contagion variable between countries A and B are measured as: the degree of competition of 
country B for the home country A in the export market of commodity x in the third market D (the export 
market share of country B in region D multiplied by the share for country A of total exports of that 
commodity x to region D) plus the degree of bilateral trade between the countries A and B. 
Bank contagion variable between countries A and Bare measured as: the share of total bank loans that 
go from third country D to country B multiplied by the share of bank loans of country A received from 
country 0. 
Stock market contagion between countries A and B measured as: average correlation of stock returns 
between countries A and B. 
9 Construction ofMPl for individual countries can be seen in section 4.1. 
10 Blanco and Garber (1986), Cumby and Van Wijenbergen (1989). 
11 Dornbusch, Goldfajn and Valdes (1995), Milesi-Feretti and Razin (1996). 
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focused on the one-step-ahead probability of regime change. 12 Also, we can classify 
previous studies as studies either including developing or developed countries and studies 
that include only specific regions such as East Asia, European Union or Latin American 
countries. 13 
Blanco and Garber (1986) developed a model to predict the timing of currency 
cnses. In the first step, they estimated parameters from money demand and future 
exchange rate equations. In the second step, they substituted the estimated parameters in 
their model to predict one-step-ahead devaluation probabilities in Mexico betweenl 973-
1981. Their empirical result shows that probabilities of devaluation increased 20% before 
the August 1976 and February 1982 Mexican currency crises. 
To determine the indicators of currency crises, Frankel and Rose (1996) pooled 
annual data with a large variety of variables for 105 developing countries from 1971 to 
1992. In their results, the foreign direct investment to debt ratio, domestic credit growth, 
growth rate of GDP, and Northern interest rates are significant determinants of the 
probability of currency crises. Meanwhile, several debt variables, the current account, 
budget deficit, and the growth rate of northern GDP are not significant. Reserves to 
import ratio and overvaluation are marginally significant. 
12 Frankel and Rose (1996), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), Klein and Marion (1994), Otker and 
Pazarbasioglu (1995). 
13 Flood and Marion (1996), Edin and Vredin (1993), Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1995), Goldstein 




The data set in this study covers 20 Emerging Market Economies from different 
regions 14, including 7 from Asia, 7 from Latin America, 3 from Europe, 2 from Africa 
and 1 from the Middle East. The selection of the countries was primarily limited by the 
availability of the required data. The data consist of quarterly macroeconomic, financial, 
external and political variables from 1984 to 2001. The choice of variables and the 
sample size are dictated by theoretical studies and the availability of data. 
Most of the data are from the International Financial Statistics CD-ROM 
database. International Financial Corporation's Emerging Market Dataset and Morgan 
Stanley Countries Index provide stock market indexes. Political stability data come from 
the International Country Risk Guide15. 
4.1 Definition of the Currency Crises and Stock Market Crises 
First, we define currency crises and stock market crises, our dependent variables. 
There are several different definitions of currency crises in the existing literature. 
However, there is only one definition of stock market crises. 
Frankel and Rose (1996) define a currency crisis as at least 25 percent 
depreciation of the nominal bilateral dollar exchange rate in one year and also at least 10 
14 List of the countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela, Indonesia, Korea, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, India, Pakistan, Greece, Portugal, Turkey, South Africa, Nigeria, and 
Jordan. 
15 The data sources and construction are described in Appendix 1. 
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per cent higher depreciation than the previous year's depreciation. They also consider the 
fact that an exchange rate crisis may be continuous and fit a three-year lag to avoid 
double counting in highly inflationary economies. 
Eichengren, Rose and Wyplosz (1996) used a broader definition of currency 
crises, "the market pressure index" (MPI), which can be formalized as: 
MPii,t = (%..:1 ei,i} + (Ai!,!} - (%..:1 ri,tl. (4.1) 
<J .Ae, i (J i,i (J .Ar, i 
where e, i and r are the bilateral exchange rate, interest rate and reserves of country "i" at 
time "t", respectively, 4 is first difference and <J is the standard deviation. An increase in 
market pressure index indicates increased pressure on the domestic currency. Equation 
( 4.1) shows that government has three choices at the time of attack: to devalue the 
exchange rate, increase interest rates, or sell foreign reserves. Eichengren, Rose and 
Wyplosz (1996) constructed the dependent variable (exchange rate crisis) as: 
Pr(Ccrisis)it = 0, otherwise. 
Where µ, and <J are the mean and standard deviation of the MPI, respectivelyo To avoid 
double counting, they considered a quarter window. 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) point out that data for interest rates are not 
available for most of the countries. Therefore, they only included the weighted average of 
exchange rate changes and reserve changes to construct the MPI. 
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Their currency crises definition is: 
Pr(Ccrisis)it = 1 if MPiit> /J,i + 3 * O"i 
Pr(Ccrisis)it = 0, otherwise. 
· In the empirical work, we will construct the MPI from the weighted average of 
exchange rate changes and reserve changes. We define a currency crisis as: 
Pcc(crisis)it = 1 if MPiit> /J,i + 1.5 * CT i 
Pcc(crisis)it = 0, otherwise. 
Patel and Sarkar (1998) defined the stock market crisis for developed and 
developing countries by constructing a variable, CMAXt, which is the ratio of the dollar-
denominated stock market index level at time t to the maximum value of the stock market 
index up to time t. CMAXt showed that the stock market index declines in emerging 
markets are larger than stock market index declines in developed markets. Therefore, 
they used different threshold levels for emerging and developed markets and defined a 
stock market crash as: 
We define a stock market crash as an event when the price index declines, 
relative to the historical maximum, more than 20 per cent for the 
developed markets, and more than 35 per cent for the emerging markets.16 
The beginning of the crash is the month when the price index falls below 
this threshold level. To avoid counting the same crisis twice, additional 
triggers occurring within a crisis are considered part of the existing 
crisis, instead of being an indicator of a new crisis (p. 6). 
16 For the developed markets and Asia, the trigger price represents a level about two standard deviations 
below the mean value of CMAX1• For Latin American markets, the trigger price is about one standard 
deviation below the mean value ofCMAXi, reflecting the higher volatility of these markets. For the sake 
of consistency, we wanted to have one trigger level for all emerging markets. 
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Patel and Sarkar's definition has a few shortcomings. First, there is a probability 
that they will not consider a sharp decline17 in the stock market index as a crisis if it does 
not meet their definition. Meanwhile, they may consider a modest decline18 in the stock 
market index as a crisis if it fits in their definition. Second, Glen (2002) points out that 
using the dollar-denominated stock market index can mislead about stock market 
movements because some of the declines in the dollar-denominated stock market index 
may reflect a pure currency movement. Therefore, a sharp depreciation can decrease the 
dollar-denominated stock market index while leaving the local currency-denominated 
stock market index unchanged. Meanwhile, most of empirical studies related to stock 
market returns in emerging economies prefer to use dollar-denominated stock market 
index 19. 
To overcome the above problems, I consider that a stock market crisis exists when 
there is a sharp decline in the stock market index. The decline in the index has to be 
"large" relative to what is considered standard from the viewpoint of each country. Also, 
we define a stock market crisis using both the dollar-denominated stock market index and 
the domestic currency-denominated stock market index. 
In our empirical work, a stock market crisis is considered to occur during the 
quarter when one of the following conditions is met: 
17 For example, 30 per cent decline in stock market index is not considered a crisis if stock market index 
declines, relative to the historical maximum, less than 35 per cent for the emerging markets. 
18 For example, 5 per cent decline in stock market index is considered a crisis if the stock market index 
declines, relative to the historical maximum, more than 35 per cent for the emerging markets. 




Pr(crisis)it = 1 if %A SMiit< -l.5*0'i - µi 
Pr( crisis )it = 0, otherwise. 
Pr(crisis)it = 1 if %A SMI it< -30 for dollar-denominated stock market crises 
Pr( crisis)it = 1 if %A SMI it< -25 for local-currency denominated stock market crises 
Pr(crisis)it = 0, otherwise. 
%A SMI is percentage change of the dollar-denominated (the local currency-
denominated) quarterly stock market index,µ and a are the mean of the %A SMI, and 
standard deviation of the %A SMI, respectively. Condition 1 attempts to capture declines 
in the dollar-denominated (the local currency-dominated) stock market indexes that are 
sufficiently large relative to the historical country-specific decline of stock market 
indexes. It states that a percentage decline of the dollar-denominated (the local currency-
denominated) quarterly stock market index has to be larger than the country specific 
mean of the %A SMI plus one and half standard deviation of the country specific %A 
SMI. Condition 2 states that a percentage decline of the dollar-denominated (the local 
currency-denominated) quarterly stock market index has to be larger than at least 30 
percent for dollar-denominated stock market index and 25 percent for the local currency-
denominated stock market index. Finally, I consider the continuity of the stock market 
and currency crises and impose a one-quarter window to avoid double counting of the 
stock market and currency crises. After we identify a crisis, we treat any crisis in the 
next quarter as a part of the same crisis and skip it before continuing to identify a new 
crisis. 
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4.2 Specification of the Empirical Model for Stock Market Crises and Currency 
Crises 
We will use following specification for our empirical analysis. 
PSMC t = f (PCC t, LCPI t-1, LIP t-1, RSMI t-1, CI t-1, WSMI t-1, USIRP t-1, WOG t-i) 
(4.2.1) 
PCC t = f (PSMC t, LCPI t-1, PS t-1, OV t-1, (STED/R) t-1, (M2/R) t-t, (CA/GDP) t-1, 
RMPit-t (4.2.2) 
where PSMC t is the stock market crisis dummy, PCC tis the currency crisis dummy, 
LCPit-1 is the inflation rate in t-1, LIP t-1 is the growth of industrial production in t-1, 
RSMit-1 is the return of regional stock market index in t-1, PCit-l is the portfolio capital 
inflow, WSMit-1 is the return of world stock market index in t-1, and WOGt-l is the 
growth of world output in t-1 in equation 4.2.1. 
OVt-1 is the real exchange rate overvaluation, (STED/R) t-1 is the ratio of short 
term external debt to reserves, (M21R)t-1 is the ratio of money supply to reserves, 
(CA/GDP) t-1 is the ratio of current account to real GDP, RMPit-1 is the regional market 
pressure index variable, and PS t-t is the political stability index in equation 4.2.2. 
Most of the specifications of macroeconomic variables in our model come from 
previous studies related to stock market returns and currency crises. In the empirical 
work, there is no clear distinction between the first and second-generation model. Most 
of the previous empirical work uses variables from both theoretical models. First, we 
will estimate separately equation (4.21) and (4.22) using a single equation probit model20• 
20 In single equation probit model I, we excluded contemporaneous stock market crises dummy and 
currency crises dummy variables to avoid endogenity bias and add lagged stock market return (Model II), 
lagged percentage change in exchange rate (Model II), lagged stock market crises dummy (Model III) and 
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Second, the existence of an empirical relationship between currency crises and stock 
market crises will be tested using a bivariate probit model. Finally, to directly see the 
correlation ( causality) between currency crises and stock market crises, we estimate 
equations (4.21) and (4.22) using a simultaneous equation probit model. 
4.3 Empirical Methodology 
We utilize several statistical methods to investigate the relationship between stock 
market and currency crises. First, we will separately estimate equation (4.21) and (4.22) 
· using single equation probit model where our binary measure of stock market crises is 
regressed against some explanatory variables (Model I), including the lagged change in 
the nominal exchange rate (Model II) and the lagged currency crises (Model III) and our 
binary measure of currency crises is regressed against some explanatory variables 
including the lagged stock market return and the lagged stock market crises. Single 
equation probit models assume that the random disturbances that affect the two crises are 
not correlated. However, it is possible that the random disturbances that affect the 
currency and stock market crises are correlated and need to be tested. Therefore, we 
estimate jointly both equations using bivariate probit models which allows for 
dependences in the correlation of the disturbances. The bivariate pro bit model can be 
expressed as follows: 




y 1 = (3 1 X1 + Ut where Y1 = 1 ifY\ >O, 0 otherwise (4.3.1). 
where Y2 = 1 ifY\ >O, 0 otherwise (4.3.2). 
Var [ut] = Var [u2] = 1 
where y* 1 and y* 2 are the latent probabilities of stock market crises and currency crises, 
respectively; Xi, X2, u1, and u2 are predetermined explanatory variables and error terms, 
respectively; (3 is corresponding parameters; and p is the correlation between the error 
terms21 . All unobservable effects are captured by the error terms, u1 and u2, and p 
measures the correlation between the disturbances. Therefore, if currency crises and 
stock market crises are related, currency crises are an unobservable in the equation of 
stock market crises and stock market crises are an unobservable in the equation of 
currency crises and p measures (roughly) the correlation between currency crises and 
stock market crises after accounting for the effect of the included variables. Even though, 
the bivariate pro bit model provides a test of the existence of an empirical relationship 
between currency crises and stock market crises and generates an estimate of the strength 
of this relationship, bivariate probit models do not provide any information about casual 
direction between currency crises and stock market crises. Therefore, we employ a 
simultaneous equation probit model to see the direct effects of currency crises on stock 
market crises and vice versa. The single equation and bivariate probit model is well 
21 Bivariate probit models assume standard normal distribution. Therefore, (u1, u2 ) - standard normal 
(0,0,1,l, p). 
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known and documented in the literature, 22 while the simultaneous equation pro bit model 
is not as well known. 
In order to obtain consistent estimates of the direct effects of currency crises on 
stock market crises and vice versa, we employ techniques that account for the 
simultaneous nature of the relationship. The simultaneous equation probit model is an 
appropriate model because stock market crises and currency crises are endogenous 
variables and should be estimated simultaneously to correct for possible endogeneity 
biases. 
Mallar (1977) stated that existence of endogenous and dichotomous explanatory 
variable in the limited dependent model may cause feedback mechanism between limited 
dependent variables and limited independent variables. Therefore, a simultaneous 
equation probit model is appropriate. Simultaneous equation estimators are calculated as 
follows: 
(1) Obtain consistent estimates of the reduced form parameters by 
maximizing the maximum likelihood functions and use these to derive 
consistent estimates of endogenous indices, and (2) substitute the 
consistent estimates of endogenous indices for their unobserved counterparts 
and maximize the maximum likelihood functions with respect to the 
structural parameters (Mallar, 1977, pp. 1719). 
Maddala (1983) showed that simultaneous equation estimation is the best 
estimator in existence for endogenous and dichotomous explanatory variables in the 
22 Greene (2000, ch. 19) 
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limited dependent model23. The simultaneous equation probit model can be expressed as 
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Y 1 = 0 otherwise 
Y 2 = 0 otherwise 
u2, it causes a direct effect on currency 
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: reduced form of equation (4.3.3) and (4.3.4) 
(4.3.5) 
(4.3.6) 
where x' s, 1C" s and v' s are reduced form explanatory variables ex' s include all the 
explanatory variables in Y1 and Y2), reduced form coefficients and reduced form error 
terms, respectively. 
23 Simultaneous equation estimation is the best estimator in the statistical sense. 
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In step one, the reduced form parameters {7r1, 7r2) of equations (4.3.5) and (4.3.6) 
can be estimated with a probit model. The normality of the error terms v1 and v2 is 
assumed. The estimated reduced form parameters are used to predict the values ofY*1 
and Y\in equations (4.3.5) and (4.3.6). Then, 
"* Y1=1i1X (4.3.7) 
(4.3.8) 
In step two, the predicted values of y* 1 and Y * 2 are be substituted in the right hand side 
of equations (4.3.3) and (4.3.4) as: 
(4.3.9) 
(4.3.10) 
where f's and ~' s are coefficients of structural equation. 
Finally, the structural equations (4.3.9) and (4.3.10) will be estimated using the 
probit maximum likelihood method, assuming normality for the error terms. In general, 
we can write probabilities in the structural form of the probit model as follows: 
p (Y1 = 1) = <p 61 Y\+ ~'1 X1) 
P (Y 2 = 1) = <Jl ( 'Y 2 Y \ + ~ '2 X2) 
where <Jl is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) associated with a standard normal 
distribution. 
Because of the two-stage estimation procedure, we cannot estimate the 
appropriate covariance matrix from the second stage structural model. Following 
Maddala (1983, 246-247), we can derive the correct covariance matrix. 
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The estimated parameters in the structural equations (4.3.9) and (4.3.10) can be 
defined by the two vectors as: 
Then the corrected covariance matrix ofN112 (a1- O'.cn) is 
where O'o1 is the true value of the two-stage estimates a1 and a.1 is the two-stage 
estimator. 
The W matrices are defined as: 
N 
W1 = 1/N EA1 zz' 
1 
N 
. W2= 1/N EA2 xx· 
1 
N 
W3 = 1/N EA1 61) zx· 
1 
N 
W4= 1/N Ea1a2E [(Y1- <I>1)(Y2-<I>2)] 
1 
where a1 = <p1 I <I>1 (1- <I>1), a2 = <p2 I <I>2 (1- <I>2), 
A1 = a1<p1, 
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Z is a matrix which includes explanatory variables in structural models and N is the 
sample size. cp is the probability density function, <I> is the cumulative density function. 
To derive the covariance matrix of 0'.2, the subscripts 1 and 2 will be interchanged in the 




5.1. Descriptive Statistics 
In this chapter, we first examine stock market crises and currency crises by 
providing some summary statistics. Descriptive statistics gives some information about 
time and regional distribution of crises and performance of crises as a predictor of each 
other. 
5.1.1 Data Sample 
The sample period includes 88 currency crisis episodes, 81 stock market crisis 
episodes based on the local currency-denominated stock market index and 81 stock 
market crisis episodes based on the dollar-denominated stock market index. 
Figure 1 shows the number of currency and stock market crises per year during 
the sample period 1984-2001. LCD SMC and DD SMC are stock market crises based on 
the local currency-denominated stock market index and the dollar-denominated stock 
market index, respectively and CC is currency crises. 
Stock market crises are relatively more frequent in 1987, 1990-1992, 1994-1995, 
1997-1998 and 2000-2001. The first peak is observed in 1987, when the Latin American 
stock markets declined sharply after the United States stock market crashed. The second 
peak is observed in 1990-1992, when Portugal, Greece, Turkey and some Asian countries 
stock markets declined sharply. A third peak is observed in 1994-1995, when the Latin 
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American stock markets crashed, again related to Mexican financial crisis of December 
1994. The fourth peak is observed in 1997-1998, when Asian stock markets crashed. 
The fifth peak observed in 2000-2001 reflects a crisis around the world24. 
Currency crises were relatively more frequent in 1992, 1997-98 and 1999-2000. 
In 1992, financial instability in Europe caused currency crises in Portugal, Greece and 
Turkey. The currency crisis in 1997-1998 reflected the Asian crises' effects on other 
countries. Finally, the peak observed in 1999-2000 was due to the Brazilian currency 
crisis and a global crisis. 
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24 Stock market and currency crises around 2000 were different from the other major crises. Crises were 
wide speared around the world instead of a specific region. 
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5.1.2 The time and regional distribution of the local currency-denominated 
stock market crises, currency crises and "twin" crises 
Tables la and lb provide a quick overview of the time distribution and regional 
distribution of the local currency-denominated stock market crises, currency crises and 
"twin" crises25 . A total of 81 stock market crises (5.9 percent of observations), 88 
currency crises (6.4 percent of observations) and 35 "twin" crises (2.3 percent 
observations) are identified in the sample period 1984-2001. We can reach the following 
conclusions from Tables la and lb: First, the number and average per year26 
(frequency)27 of stock market and "twin" crises has increased ( decreased) over time while 
the number, average per year and frequency of currency crises tend to be stable. As can 
be seen from Table la, the number of stock market crises tripled and "twin" crises 
doubled over time in our sample period while the number of currency crises was 
constant. Also, the average stock market crises per year tripled and "twin" crises per year 
doubled over time. However, average currency crises per year decreased slightly. 
Finally, the frequency of crises shows that in 1996-2001 there was a stock market crisis 
on average every 2.9 years and "twin" crisis every 7.5 years while in 1984-1989 we had a 
stock market crisis an average, every 7.5 years and "twin" crises every 15 years. 
25 "Twin" crises are defined as a stock market crisis accompanied by a currency crisis in either the 
previous, current, or following quarter. 
26 Average crises per year is calculated as the number of crises multiplied by number of countries in sample 
and the result divided by total sum of country-years. 
27 Frequency of crises is calculated as the total sum of country-years divided by number of crises. 
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Table 1 b shows the distribution of crises by regions. Asia has the highest number 
of stock market, currency, and "twin" crises28• Also, Asia has the highest average stock 
market and ''twin" crises per year, followed by the Latin America. Finally, currency 
crises are equally distributed among all the regions. 
28 The Latin American countries included are Argentina, Brazil., Chile, Columbia, Mexico, Peru, and 
Venezuela. Asian countries included are Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, India, and 
Pakistan. Other countries included are Greece, Portugal, Turkey, Nigeria, South Africa and Jordan. 
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Table la. Local Currency Denominated Stock Market Crises and Currency Crises 
Time distribution of local currency-denominated stock market crises and 
currency crises 
1984-2001 1984-1989 1990-1995 1996-2001 
Stock Market Crises 
Number of Crises 81 14 25 42 
Average Crises Per Year 4.7 2.7 4.3 7.0 
Frequency of Crises 4.2 7.5 4.8 2.9 
Currency Crises 
Number of Crises 88 28 29 31 
Average Crises Per Year 5.1 5.3 4.8 5.1 
Frequency of Crises 3.9 3.8 4.1 3.9 
Twin Crises 
Number of Crises 32 7 9 16 
Average Crises Per Year 1.9 1.3 1.5 2.7 
Frequency of Crises 10.8 15.0 13.0 7.5 
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Table lb. 
Regional distribution of local currency-denominated stock market crises and 
currency crises 
Asia Latin America Others 
Stock Market Crises 
Number of Crises 38 23 20 
Average Crises Per Year 2.2 1.4 1.2 
Frequency of Crises 3.2 5.2 5.1 
Currency Crises 
Number of Crises 31 29 28 
Average Crises Per Year 1.8 1.7 1.6 
Frequency of Crises 4.0 4.0 3.6 
Twin Crises 
Number of Crises 16 10 6 
Average Crises Per Year 0.91 0.58 0.35 
Frequency of Crises 6.4 12.0 17.0 
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5.1.3 The time and regional distribution of the dollar-denominated stock 
market crises, currency crises and "twin" crises 
Tables 2a and 2b show the time distribution and regional distribution of the 
dollar-denominated stock market crises, currency crises and "twin" crises. A total of 81 
stock market crises (5.9 percent of observations), 88 currency crises (6.4 percent of 
observations), and 40 "twin" crises (2.9 percent of observations) are identified in the 
sample period 1984-2001. 
As can be seen from Tables la, lb, 2a, and 2b, the time distribution and regional 
distribution of the dollar-denominated stock market crises is not much different than the 
local currency-denominated stock market crises. However, the number and the regional 
distribution of"twin" crises show significant differences. First, the number of "twin" 
crises increased from 32 to 40 in our sample periods 1984-2001. Others have the highest 
increase with 50 percent, followed by the Latin America with 20 percent. It is obvious 
that using the dollar-denominated stock market index to define stock market crises will 
increase "twin" crises because a huge depreciation decreases the dollar-denominated 
stock market index29 while it leaves the local currency-denominated stock market index 
unchanged. In this scenario, we identify a dollar-denominated stock market crisis and a 
"twin" crisis but we could not identify a local currency-denominated stock market crisis 
and a "twin" crisis. Second, ''twin" crises are equally distributed among all the regions. 
29 In this scenario, it is assumed that local currency-denominated stock market index unchanged. 
Therefore, decrease in the dollar-dominated stock market reflects pure currency depreciation. 
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Table 2a. Dollar-Denominated Stock Market Crises and Currency Crises 
Time distribution of dollar-denominated stock market crises and currency crises 
1984-2001 1984-1989 1990-1995 1996-2001 
Stock Market Crises 
Number of Crises 81 18 26 37 
Average Crises Per Year 4.7 3.4 4.3 6.2 
Frequency of Crises 4.2 5.8 4.6 3.2 
Currency Crises 
Number of Crises 88 28 29 31 
Average Crises Per Year 5.1 5.3 4.8 5.1 
Frequency of Crises 3.9 3.8 4.1 3.9 
Twin Crises 
Number of Crises 40 7 13 20 
Average Crises Per Year 2.3 1.4 2.1 3.4 
Frequency of Crises 8.6 15.0 9.2 6.0 
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Table 2b. 
Regional distribution of dollar-denominated stock market crises and currency 
' 
crises 
Asia Latin America Others 
Stock Market Crises 
Number of Crises 32 28 21 
Average Crises Per Year 1.8 1.6 1.2 
Frequency of Crises 3.8 4.3 4.9 
Currency Crises 
Number of Crises 31 29 28 
Average Crises Per Year 1.8 1.7 1.6, 
Frequency of Crises 4.0 4.0 3.6 
Twin Crises 
Number of Crises 16 12 12 
Average Crises Per Year 0.9 0.7 0.7 
Frequency of Crises 7.7 10.0 8.5 
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5.1.4. Performance of crises as a predictor of each other 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and Glick and Hutckinson (2001) used the signal 
approach to link banking crises and currency crises. In this section, the same procedure 
is adopted to discuss the link between stock market and currency crises, the method of 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) is followed. 
The following matrix is used to measure the performance of stock market crises 
and currency crises as predictors of each other. 
Currency Crisis (t) No Currency Crisis (t) 
Stock Market Crisis (t) A (t) B (t) 
No Stock Market Crisis (t) C (t) D (t) 
A(t) is the number of instances in which a stock market crisis issues a signal in a· 
particular quarter t and a currency crisis occurred in quarter t (i.e. A(t) is the number of 
quarters the stock market crisis provides "good signal" about the occurrence of currency 
crisis). B(t) is the number of instances in which a stock market crisis issues a signal in a 
particular quarter t and a currency crisis did not occur in quarter t (i.e. B(t) is the number 
of quarters the stock market crisis provide ''bad signal" or "noise" about the occurrence 
of currency crises). C(t) is the number of instances in which a stock market crisis did not 
issue a signal in a particular quarter t when there was a currency crisis in quarter t (i.e. 
C(t) is the number of quarters the stock market crisis did not provide a good signal about 
the occurrence of currency crises). D(t) is the number of instances in which a stock 
market crisis did not issue a signal in a particular quarter t when there was no currency 
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crisis in quarter t (i.e. D(t) is the number of quarters in which neither a stock market crisis 
or currency crises occurred). It is obvious from the above matrix that the perfect 
predictor will produce only observations A and D. 
Table 3a shows the local currency-denominated stock market crises in 'quarter t, 
which followed by currency crises in quarter (t-1 ), t and (t+ 1 ). The first column shows 
the number of the local currency --denominated stock market crises. The second, third 
and fourth columns show whether the local currency-denominated stock market crises in 
quarter t was accompanied by a currency crisis one period before, contemporaneously 
and one period ahead, respectively. The last column shows the predictive power of stock 
market crises30• Table 3b shows whether currency crises in quarter t are accompanied by 
· local currency-denominated stock market crises quarter in (t-1 ), t and (t+ 1 ). 
Based on the comparison of tables 3a and 3b, we can reach several conclusions. 
The percentage of local currency-denominated stock market crises associated with 
currency crises at time t-1, t and t+ 1 is 7 percent, 22 percent and 10 percent, respectively. 
The percentage of currency crises associated with local currency-denominated stock 
market crises at time t-1, t and t+ 1 is 9 percent, 20 percent and 7 percent, respectively. 
Based on Tables 3a and 3b, we can conclude that both crises appear to occur at the same 
time and the local currency-denominated stock market crises slightly lead currency crises 
rather than vice-versa31 • The last columns show that the predictive power oflocal 
currency-denominated stock market crises about the onset of currency crises (32 percent) 
is higher than the predictive power of currency crises (28 percent). In Asia, the 
30 Number of stock market crises was accompanied by currency crises at time t and (t+ 1 ). 
31 Tables 3a and 3b show that the percentage oflocal currency-denominated stock market crises preceding a 
currency crisis (9 percent) is higher than the percentage of currency crises preceding a local currency-
dominated stock market crisis (7 percent). 
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predictive power oflocal currency-denominated stock market crises (34 percent) is lower 
than the predictive power of currency crises (40 percent). fu Latin America, the 
predictive power of local currency-denominated stock market crises (34 percent) is 
higher than the predictive power of currency crises (30 percent). 
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Table 3a. Local Currency-Denominated Stock Market Crises as a Predictor of 
Currency Crises 
Number (Percentage) of Stock Stock Market 
Number of Market Crises Accompanied by Crises Predicting 
Stock Market Currency Crises Currency Crises 
Crises 
A (t-1) A(t) A (t+l) A (t,t+l)) 
All 81 6 (7) 18 (22) 8 (10) 26 (32) 
Countries 
Asia 38 2 (5) 10 (26) 4 (8) 14 (34) 
Latin 23 2 (8) 7 (30) 1 (4) 8 (34) 
America 
Others 20 2 (10) 1 (5) 3 (15) 4 (20) 
Table 3b. Currency Crises as a Predictor of Local Currency-Denominated Stock 
Market Crises 
Number (Percentage) of Currency Crises 
Currency Crises Accompanied by Predicting 
Number of Stock Market Crises Stock Market 
Currency Crises 
Crises 
A (t-1) A(t) A (t+l) A (t,t+ 1)) 
All 88 8 (9) 18 (21) 6 (7) 24 (28) 
Countries 
Asia 30 4 (13) 10 (33) 2 (7) 12 (40) 
Latin 30 1 (3) 7 (23) 2 (7) 9 (30) 
America 
Others 28 3 (11) 1 (4) 2 (8) 3 (12) 
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Tables 4a and 4b show the performance of the dollar-denominated stock market 
crises and currency crises as predictors of each other. The percentage of the dollar-
dominated stock market crise,s associated with currency crises at time t-1, t and t+ 1 are 6 
percent, 33 percent and 9 percent, respectively. The percentage of currency crises 
associated with dollar-denominated stock market crises at time t-1, t and t+ 1 are 9 
percent, 30 percent and 6 percent, respectively. Based on Tables 4a and 4b, one conclude 
that both crises appear to occur at the same time and the dollar-denominated stock market 
crises lead currency crises rather than vice-versa. The last columns show that the 
predictive power of the dollar-denominated stock market crises (42 percent) is higher 
than the predictive power of currency crises (36 percent). 
It can be seen from the last columns of the Tables 3a and 4a that the predictive 
power of dollar-denominated stock market crises ( 42 percent) is higher than the 
predictive power oflocal currency-dominated stock market crises (32 percent). Also, the 
predictive power of currency crises (36 percent) ) is higher than the predictive power of 
currency crises (28 percent) as can be seen from the last columns of Tables 3b and 4b. It 
is clear that a sharp currency depreciation can decrease the dollar-denominated stock 
market index while leaving local currency-denominated stock market index unchanged. 
Therefore, we can identify more "twin" crises when we use dollar-denominated stock 
market index. 
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Table 4a. Dollar-Denominated Stock Market Crises as a Predictor of Currency 
Crises 
Number (Percentage) of Stock Stock Market 
Number of Market Crises Accompanied by Crises 
Stock Market Currency Crises Predicting 
Crises Currency Crises 
A (t-1) A(t) A (t+l) A(t,t+l)) 
All 81 5 (6) 27 (33) 8 (9) 35 (42) 
Countries 
Asia 32 1 (3) 12 (38) 3 (9) 15 (47) 
Latin 28 2 (7) 9 (32) 1 (4) 10 (36) 
America 
Others 21 2 (10) 6 (30) 4 (20) 10 (50) 
Table 4b. Currency Crises as a Predictor of Dollar-Denominated Stock Market 
Crises 
Number (Percentage) of Currency Crises 
Number of Currency Crises Accompanied by Predicting 
Currency Stock Market Crises Stock Market 
Crises Crises 
A (t-1) A (t) A (t+l) A (t,t+l)) 
All 88 8 (9) 27 (30) 5 (6) 32 (36) 
Countries 
Asia 30 3 (10) 12 (40) 1 (3) 13 (43) 
Latin 30 1 (3) 9 (30) 2 (6) 11 (36) 
America 
Others 28 4 (14) 6 (21) 2 (7) 8 (28) 
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5.1.5 Performance of crises as a signal of each other 
Tables 5a and 5b are constructed from the previous matrix. Tables 5a and 5b 
report calculations of the noise-to-signal ratio associated with the local currency-
dominated stock market crises and currency crises. The noise-to-signal ratio for currency 
crises (the local currency-denominated stock market crises) is calculated by dividing 
number of bad signals issued by the local currency-denominated stock market crises 
(currency crises) as a percentage of number of quarters where bad signals could have 
been issued, by the number of good signals issued by the local currency-denominated 
stock market crises (currency crises) as a percentage of the number of quarters where a 
good signal could have been issued32. An increase in good signals and decrease in bad 
signals (noise) lowers the above ratio therefore we prefer lower noise-to-signal ratio. 
Tables 5a and 5b show that the contemporaneous (t) noise-to-signal ratios are 
lower than the leading (t+ 1) noise-to-signal ratios. Also, the contemporaneous noise-to-
signal ratio of currency crises and the local currency-denominated stock market crises are 
not much different from each other both for the full sample and regional. However, for 
Asia (Latin America) the leading (t+ 1) noise-to-signal ratio of stock market crises is 
higher (lower) than currency crises. The overall performance of the local currency-
denominated stock market crises ( currency crises) as a signal of currency crises (the local 
currency-denominated stock market crises) can be seen from the last column of Tables 5a 
and 5b. All numbers are less than 1 implying that when local currency-denominated 
stock market crises occur currency crises are more likely than not and vice-versa, 
32 Noise-to-Signal Ratio is [B/ (B+D)/ (A/A+C)], where Bis the number of the local currency-denominated 
stock market crises not accompanied by a currency crises, (B+D) is the total number of quarters without a 
currency crises, A is the number of the local currency-dominated stock market crises accompanied by a 
currency crises and (A+C) is the total number of currency crises. 
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Table 5a. Performance of Local Currency-Denominated Stock Market Crises as a 
Signal of Currency Crises 
Noise-to-Signal Ratio of Currency Crises 
t t+l ( t) + ( t+l) 
All Countries 0.24 0.85 0.16 
Asia 0.18 0.56 0.10 
Latin America 0.15 1.46 0.12 
Others 1.11 0.33 0.23 
Table 5b. Performance of Currency Crises as a Signal of Local Currency-
Denominated Stock Market Crises 
Noise-to-Signal Ratio of Stock Market Crises 
t t+l (t)+(t+l) 
All Countries 0.24 0.86 0.16 
Asia 0.17 1.20 0.13 
Latin America 0.17 0.70 0.12 
Others 1.40 0.67 0.43 
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Tables 6a and 6b report calculation of the noise-to-signal ratio associated with 
dollar-denominated stock market crises and currency crises. The results are similar to 
Tables Sa and Sb. 
Table 6a. Performance of Dollar-Denominated Stock Market Crises as a Signal of 
Currency Crises 
Noise-to-Signal Ratio of Currency Crises 
t t+l (t)+(t+l) 
All Countries 0.14 0.63 0.09 
Asia 0.11 0.62 0.08 
Latin America 0.14 1.80 0.13 
Others 0.14 0.25 0.07 
Table 6b. Performance of Currency Crises as a Signal of Dollar-Denominated 
Stock Market Crises 
Noise-to-Signal Ratio of Stock Market Crises 
t t+l (t)+(t+l) 
All Countries 0.14 1.04 0.11 
Asia 0.10 0.74 0.07 
Latin America 0.14 0.87 0.12 
Others 0.16 0.56 0.11 
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5.2. Estimates of Currency and Stock Market Crises using Single Equation 
Probit Model 
Descriptive statistics analysis shows that there is a link between stock market 
crises and currency crises; however, it has a few shortcomings. First, it deals with each 
variable separately and therefore ignores correlations between variables. Second, it 
ignores the joint contribution of variables to stock market crises and currency crises. 
Finally, there is no test to assess the statistical significance of the results based on the 
descriptive statistics. Therefore, we further investigation using more sophisticated 
econometric tools is required. 
In this section, we examine potential linkages between stock market crises and 
currency crises and estimate variety of single equation probit models. In Model I, our 
binary measure of stock market crises is regressed against explanatory variables 
(Inflation Rate, Industrial Production Growth, Regional Stock Market Return, Portfolio 
Capital Inflows, World Stock Market Return and World Output Growth). Model II is 
including Model I and a lagged percentage changes in nominal exchange rates. Model III 
is including Model I and a lagged currency crises dummy variable. Also, our binary 
measure of currency crises is regressed against explanatory variables (Inflation Rate, 
Overvaluation, Current Account/ GDP, Political Stability, Short Term External Debt/ 
Reserves, M2/ Reserves and Regional Market Pressure Index) in Model I. Model II is 
including Model I and a lagged stock market returns. Model III is including Model I and 
a lagged stock market crises dummy variable. 
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In order to test for the link between stock market crises and currency crises, we 
introduce the lagged percentage change in the exchange rate and lagged currency crisis 
dummy variables in to the stock market crisis equation and, similarly, the lagged stock 
market return and lagged stock market crisis dummy variables in to the currency crisis 
equation. If the coefficients associated with the lagged dummy variables are significant, 
we conclude that stock market crises are a good leading indicator of currency crises and 
currency crises are a good leading indicator of stock market crises in emerging market 
. . 
economies or vice-versa. 
5.2.1. Single Equation Probit Model Results for Dollar-Denominated Stock 
Market Crises 
In this and the next sections, we use quarterly observations for twenty countries 
. over the entire sample period, 1984.Ql-2001.Q4. Table 7a reports the regression results 
of the pro bit model of the probability of stock market crisis with currency crises and a set 
oflocal and global control variables. Three different versions of the dollar-denominated 
stock market crises model are estimated: one without lagged change in the exchange rate 
and lagged currency crises, one with lagged change in the exchange rate and the other 
with lagged currency crises. 
The second, fourth and sixth columns show coefficient estimates of the dollar-
denominated stock market crises. I also include the associated z-statistics in parentheses, 
which test (individual independent variables) the null hypothesis ofno effect. The 
magnitude of the pro bit model coefficients does not have a straightforward interpretation. 
They indicate whether the coefficients are statistically significant and indicate whether 
the impact of explanatory variables is positive or negative. 
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Since the probit model coefficients cannot give any information about magnitude 
of explanatory variables on the dependent variable, I report the marginal effects in the 
third, fifth and seventh columns. The marginal effect is the effect of a one-unit change in 
the reqressor on the probability of crises, evaluated at the mean of the data. 
Several diagnostic tests also are reported at the foot of the tables, including the 
McFadden-R2 and log-likelihood test. The McFadden-R2 shows how well our model can 
explain crises and it increases as the fit of model improves33• Log-likelihood tests the 
joint significance of all the coefficients. P-values show the significance level of the log-
likelihood tests. 
All variables in the dollar-denominated stock crises models have the expected 
sign and are statistically significant, except for world output growth in all models, lagged 
change of the exchange rate in Model II, and the lagged currency crises dummy variables 
in Model III. The coefficient of inflation rate shows that one percentage point increase in 
inflation rate raises the probability of a dollar-denominated stock market crisis by 0.22 
percentage points. The finding supports the "proxy effect theory", which states, an 
increase in the inflation rate, decreases output growth, which in turn causes the stock 
market to decline. 
The coefficient for industrial production growth shows that a one percentage point 
decrease in industrial production growth raises the probability of dollar-denominated 
stock market crises by 0.25 percentage points. Robust economic growth is viewed as a 
sign of strong economic fundamentals by investors. Therefore, an increase in industrial 
33 The McFadden-R2 = 1- ln LI 1n Lo where lnL and lnLo are the maximized value of the log-likelihood 
function and the log-likelihood computed with only a constant term. 
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production will increase investors' confidence in the stock market and decrease the 
probability of crises. 
Regional stock market return and world stock market return are negative and 
statistically significant, as expected. The coefficient for the regional stock market return 
(world stock market return) shows that a one percentage point decrease in the regional 
stock market return (world stock market return) increases the probability of a dollar-
denominated stock market crises by 0.15 (0.01) percentage points. The finding suggests 
that a decline in regional and in world stock market return is expected to increase the 
probability of stock market crises. This can be seen as evidence in favor of the existence 
of a contagion effect. 
The coefficient of the ratio of portfolio capital inflows to market capitalization 
variable is negative and statistically significant, as expected. One percentage point 
increases in the portfolio capital inflows decreases the probability of a dollar-
denominated stock market crises by 0.066 percentage points. Increases in portfolio 
capital inflows show inflows of foreign funds at least in the short-run, will tend to reduce 
the probability of a crisis. 
Finally, the coefficients associated with the lagged change in exchange rate and 
lagged currency crises dummy variables are insignificant in our model, suggesting that 
currency crises are not a leading indicator of dollar-denominated stock market crises. 
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Table 7a. Probit Results and Marginal Effects for Dollar-Denominated Stock 
Market Crises 
Model I Model II Model Ill 
Variables Estimates Marginal Estimates Marginal Estimates Marginal 
(z-stat.) Effects (z-stat.) Effects (z-stat.) Effects 
Inflation 2.301 0.2222 1.494 0.1435 2.515 0.2412 
Rate (t-1) (1.84)* (0.94) (1.82)* 
Industrial Prod. -2.609 -0.2519 -2.612 -0.2508 -2.615 -0.2507 
Growth(t-1) (-1.82)* (-1.83)* (-1.79)* 
Regional Stock -1.585 -0.1530 -1.574 -0.1511 -1.505 -0.1445 
Market Return (-2.9)*** (-2.8)*** (-2.7)*** 
(t-1) 
Portfolio Capital -0.686 -0.0662 -0.672 -0.0646 -0.693 -0.0665 
Inflows (t-1) (-3.1)*** (-3.1)*** (-3.1)*** 
World Stock -0.109 -0.0105 -0.110 -0.0105 -0.111 0.0105 
Market Return (-5.2)*** (-5.3)*** (-5.3)*** 
(t-1) 
World Output -0.274 -0.0264 -0.278 -0.0333 -0.252 -0.0242 
Growth (t-1) (-1.22) (-1.23) (-1.12) 




Currency Crises -0.159 -0.0135 
Dummy(t-1) (-0.60) 
Log-Likelihood -235.225 -234.900 -232.098 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 
McFadden-R2 0.12 0.12 0.12 
Number of Obs. 1120 1120 1111 
Number of 72 72 71 
Crises 
*, ** and *** correspond to the 10%, 5% and 1 % significance level, respectively. 
70 
A useful summary of the prediction ability of the probit model is a table of the 
hits and misses of a prediction rule as follows: predict a crisis period when the predictive 
choice probability is greater than a selective cutoff-point, otherwise a zero. Since the 
predictive ability of the estimated probit model is sensitive to the cutoff-point (the 
probability value) used in the prediction rule, I report the results using a number of 
cutoff-points. The left side (the right side) of table 7b shows the prediction ability of the 
Model I (Model II) for dollar-denominated stock market crises using different cutoff-
point. A is the number of stock market crises correctly predicted; B is the number of 
stock market crises not correctly predicted (Type I error); C is the number of crises 
predicted when there were no crises (Type II error); D is the number of crises not 
predicted when there were no crises 
The bottom of the table 7b shows goodness-of -fit statistics for our model. Those 
statistics are calculated as follows: 
% of observation called correctly: (D+A)lnumber of total observations. 
% of Type I and Type II errors: (B+C)I number of total observations. 
% of crises called correctly (conditional probability): Al (A+B). 
% of false alarms to total alarms: Cl(C+A). 
% of probability of crises given an alarm (good signals): Al (A+C). 
% of probability of crises given no alarm (noise): Bl (B+D). 
Noise-to-Signal ratio: [Bl (B+D)IAI (A+C)] 
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As expected, the predictive ability of the estimated probit model is sensitive to the 
cutoff-point used in the prediction rule. For instance, the percentage of crises predicted 
correctly ranges from 31 percent (for the cutoff-point of 0.20) to 3 percent (for the cutoff-
point of 0.50) in Model I. If a 0.50 cutoff-point is chosen, we will predict relatively few 
crises and as a result the ability of the model to predict crises will be underestimated. 
Greene (2000) states that increasing the cutoff-point will always reduce the probability of 
Type II errors while increasing the probability of Type I errors and there is no clear 
answer as to the best cutoff-point to choose. The lowest total error rate is generated by 
Model I with the cutoff-point 0.40 and only 8 percent of crises is correctly predicted at 
this the cutoff level. In applications, the choice of the cutoff-point level will depend on 
the relative cost associated with Type I and Type II errors but in practice, it is not easy to 
measure the cost of Type I and Type II errors. 
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Table 7b. Prediction (Goodness-of -Fit) Ability of the Probit Model 
The dollar-denominated stock market crises 
Predicted Probabilities Model I Model II 
(Cutoff-Points) A B C D A B C D 
20 % cutoff 22 50 34 1014 20 52 35 1013 
30 % cutoff 10 62 12 1036 9 63 12 1036 
40 % cutoff 6 66 5 1043 5 67 5 1043 
50 % cutoff 2 70 4 1044 2 70 4 1044 
60 % cutoff 0 72 1 1047 0 72 1 1047 
Model I Model II 
Cutoff Percentages 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% .. 
% of observations 
correctly called 93 93 93 93 93 92 93 93 93 93 
% of Type I and Type 
II errors 7.50 6.61 6.34 6.61 6.52 7.77 6.70 6.43 6.61 6.52 
% of crises correctly 
called 31 15 8 3 0 28 13 7 3 0 
% of false alarms of 
total alarm 61 55 45 67 100 64 57 50 67 100 
% probabilities of 
crisis given an alarm 39 45 55 33 0 36 43 50 33 0 
% probabilities of 
crisis given no alarm 4.7 5.6 6.0 6.3 6.4 4.9 5.7 6.0 6.3 6.4 
Noise-to-signal 
ratio 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.19 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.19 
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5.2.2. Single Equation Probit Model Results for Local Currency-
Denominated Stock Market Crises 
Table 8a reports the regression results of the probit model of the probability of 
local currency-denominated stock market crisis with a set of local and global control 
variables. Three different versions of the local currency-denominated stock market crises 
model are estimated. 
The regional stock market return, portfolio capital inflows and world stock market 
return variables are significant and negative in all three models, as expected. The 
coefficient for regional stock market return (world stock market return) shows that a one 
percentage point decrease in the regional stock market return (world stock market return) 
raises the probability of a local currency-denominated stock market crisis by 0.19 (0.012) 
percentage point. The finding suggests that a decline in regional and in world stock 
market returns will increase the probability of a stock market crisis. This can be seen as 
evidence in favor of the existence of the contagion effect. 
The inflation rate is significant in Model I and III while industrial production 
growth and world output growth are insignificant in all three models. On the other hand, 
the coefficient associated with lagged change in exchange rate and lagged currency crises 
dummy variables are insignificant in our model, suggesting that currency crises are not a 
leading indicator of local currency-denominated stock market crises. 
The left side (the right side) of Table 8b shows the prediction ability of the Model 
I (Model II) for local currency-denominated stock market crises using different cutoff-
points. 
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Based on comparison of the dollar-denominated and local currency-denominated 
stock market crises, we can reach following conclusions: The predictive ability of the 
dollar-denominated stock market crisis model is higher than the predictive ability of the 
local currency-denominated stock market crisis model. For instance, moving from 
dollar-denominated stock market crises to local currency-denominated stock market 
crises decreases the percentage of correctly called crises and increases the percentage of 
false alarm in all cutoff-point level. Also, dollar denominated stock market crises have 
lower wrong predictions (Type I plus Type II errors) and noise-to-signal ratios than local 
currency-denominated stock market crises at all cutoff-point levels. 
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Table Sa. Probit Results and Marginal Effects for Local Currency-Denominated -
Stock Market Crises 
Model I Model II Model Ill 
Variables Estimates Marginal Estimates Marginal Estimates Margina 
(z-stat.) Effects (z-stat.) Effects (z-stat.) Effects 
Inflation 2.092 0.2012 2.204 0.2119 2.256 0.2148 
Rate (t-1) (1.67)* (1.52) (1.65)* 
Industrial Produ. -1.896 -0.1823 -1.902 -0.1828 -1.894 -0.1802 
Growth (t-1) (-1.37) (-1.37) (-1.33) 
Regional Stock -2.037 -0.1959 -2.040 -0.1961 -1.969 -0.1773 
Market Return (-3.8)*** (-3.8)*** (-3.7)*** 
(t-1) 
Portfolio Capital -0.502 -0.0482 -0.504 -0.0484 -0.513 -0.0488 
Inflows (t-1) (-2.25)** (-2.30)** (-2.27)** 
World Stock -0.127 -0.0122 -0.127 -0.0122 -0.129 -0.0123 
Market Return (-6.1)*** (-6.1)*** (-6.2)*** 
(t-1) 
World Output -0.116 -0.0111 -0.116 -0.0111 -0.097 -0.0092 
Growth (t-1) (-0.53) (-0.53) (-0.44) 
% Change of 
Nominal 0.0003 0.00003 
Exchange (0.2) 
Rate (t-1) 
Currency Crises -0.198 -0.0163 
Dummy(t-1) (-0.72) 
Log-Likelihood -235.901 -235.890 -232.629 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 
McFadden-R2 0.13 0.13 0.13 
Number of Obs. 1122 1122 1113 
Number of 74 74 73 
Crises 
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Table Sb. Prediction (Goodness-of-Fit) Ability of the Probit Model 
The local currency-denominated stock market crises 
Model I Model II 
Predicted Probabilities 
(Cutoff-Points) A B C D A B C D 
20 % cutoff 17 57 41 1007 16 58 36 1012 
30 % cutoff 7 67 13 1035 7 67 12 1036 
40 % cutoff 5 69 7 1041 5 69 8 1040 
50 % cutoff 2 72 5 1043 2 72 5 1043 
60 % cutoff 0 74 4 1044 0 74 4 1044 
Model I Model II 
Cutoff Percentages 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 
% of observations 
91 93 93 93 93 92 93 93 93 93 
correctly called 
% of Type I and Type 
8.73 7.13 6.77 6.86 6.96 8.39 7.05 6.88 6.88 6.96 
II errors 
% of crises correctly 
23 10 7 3 0 22 9 7 3 0 
called 
% of false alarms of 
71 65 58 71 100 69 63 61 71 100 
total alarm 
% probabilities of crisis 
29 35 42 29 0 31 37 39 29 0 
given an alarm 
% probabilities of crisis 
5.4 6.1 6.2 6.5 6.6 5.4 6.1 6.2 6.4 6.6 
given no alarm 
Noise-to-signal 
0.18 0.17 0.15 0.22 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.22 
ratio 
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5.2.3. Single Equation Probit Model for Currency Crises with Dollar-
Denominated Stock Market Crises 
Table 9a reports the regression results of the pro bit model of currency crises with 
lagged dollar-denominated stock market return and lagged dollar-denominated stock 
market crises and a set of internal and global control variables. There are three currency 
crises models. The first model uses only a set of internal and global control variables as 
explanatory variables, the second model uses lagged dollar-denominated stock market 
return as an explanatory variable and the third model uses lagged dollar-denominated 
stock market crises dummy as an explanatory variable. 
All variables in the currency crises models are statistically significant except short 
term external debt in all three models, the lagged dollar denominated stock market return 
in Model II, and the lagged dollar denominated stock market crises dummy variable in 
Model III. Inflation rate, overvaluation, the ratio of money supply to reserves and the 
regional market pressure index have positive signs as expected and are statistically 
significant in all three models. An increase in those variables increases the probability of 
currency crises. The coefficient of the regional market pressure index shows that a one 
percentage point increase in the regional market pressure index raises the probability of 
currency crises by 0.055 percent. This can be seen as evidence in favor of the existence 
of the contagion effect. 
Political stability and the current account to GDP variable both are negative, as 
expected, and statistically significant. A decrease in these variables increases the 
probability of currency crises. 
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The coefficients associated with the lagged dollar-denominated stock market 
return and lagged dollar-denominated stock market crises dummy variables are not 
statistically significant, suggesting that the lagged dollar-denominates stock market return 
and crises are not leading indicators of currency crises in emerging market economies. 
This results from single equation probit model do not support Kaminksy, Lizondo and 
Reinhart (1997) and Kaminksy and Reinhart (1999). Using the "signal approach model", 
they found that stock prices are a good leading indicator of currency crises. 
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Table 9a. Probit Results and Marginal Effects for Currency Crises with the Dollar-
Denominated Stock Market Crises 
Model I Model II Model III 
Variables Estimates Marginal Estimates Marginal Estimates Marginal 
(z-stat.) Effects (z-stat.) Effects (z-stat.) Effects 
Inflation 2.889 0.2043 3.062 0.2165 2.854 0.2037 
Rate (t-1) (2.59)*** (2.66)*** (2.57)*** 
Political Stability -0.021 -0.0020 -0.020 -0.0014 -0.021 -0.0014 
(t-1) (-3.6)*** (-3.7)*** (-3.6)*** 
Overvaluation 0.00005 0.000004 0.00005 0.000004 0.00005 0.000004 
(t-1) (2.49)** (2.46)** (2.49)** 
Short Term 0.014 0.0010 0.014 0.0010 0.014 0.0010 
External Debt (0.95) (0.92) (0.93) 
(t-1) 
Money Supply/ 0.017 0.0011 0.017 0.0012 0.017 0.0012 
Reserves (t-1) (3.10)*** (3.03)*** (3.04)*** 
Current Account/ -6.655 -0.4707 -6.444 -0.4557 -6.846 -0.4886 
GDP (t-1) (-1.96)** (-1.90)** (-2.01)** 
Regional Market 0.777 0.0549 0.7356 0.0454 0.7334 0.0453 
Pressure Index (9.44)*** (8.61)*** (8.70)*** 
(t-1) 
Stock Market -0.030 -0.002 
Return (t-1) (-1.09) 
Stock market 0.221 0.0189 
Crises (t-1) (0.84) 
Log-Likelihood -205.508 -204.956 -205.128 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 
McFadden-R2 0.26 0.26 0.26 
Number of Obs. 1117 1117 1112 
Number of 77 77 77 
Crises 
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The left side (the right side) of Table 9b shows the prediction ability of Model I (Model 
II) for currency crises using different cutoff-points. The percentage of crises predicted 
correctly ranges from 40 percent (for the cutoff-point of 0.20) to 13 percent (for the 
cutoff-point of 0. 70) in Model I. The lowest total error rate is generated by the Model I 
with cutoff-point 0.60 and only 16 percent of crises are correctly predicted at this the 
cutoff level. 
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Table 9b. Prediction (Goodness-of -Fit) Ability of the Probit Model 
Currency crises with dollar-denominated stock market crises 
Model I Model II 
Predicted Probabilities 
(Cutoff-Points) A B C D A B C D 
20 % cutoff 31 46 52 988 31 46 51 989 
30 % cutoff 23 54 25 1015 24 53 21 1019 
40 % cutoff 16 61 13 1027 16 61 11 1029 
50 % cutoff 13 64 6 1034 13 64 6 1034 
60 % cutoff 12 65 2 1038 12 65 2 1038 
70 % cutoff 10 67 2 1038 10 67 2 1038 
Model I Model II 
Cutoff 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 
Percentages 
70% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 
% of obs. 
correctly 91 93 93 94 94 94 91 93 93 94 94 94 
called 
% of Type I 
and Type II 8.77 7.07 6.62 6.27 6.00 6.18 8.68 6.62 6.44 6.27 6.00 6.18 
errors 
% of crises 
correctly 40 30 21 17 16 13 40 31 21 17 16 13 
called 
% of false 
alarms of 63 52 33 32 14 17 62 47 41 32 14 17 
total alarm 
%prob. of .. 
37 48 67 68 86 cnsis given 83 38 53 59 68 86 83 
an alarm 
%prob. of .. 




0.12 0.11 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.12 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.07 
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5.2.4. Single Equation Probit Model for Currency Crises with Local 
Currency-Denominated Stock Market Crises 
Table 10a reports the regression results of the probit model of the probabilities of 
currency crisis with the lagged local currency-denominated stock market return, lagged 
local currency-denominated stock market crises and a set of local and global control 
variables. There are three currency crises models. The first model uses only a set of 
internal and global control variables as explanatory variables; the second model uses the 
lagged local currency-denominated stock market return as an explanatory variable; the 
third model uses the lagged local currency-denominated stock market crises dummy as an 
explanatory variable. 
· The results are similar to the previous currency crises model. All variables in the 
currency crises models are statistically significant, except short-term external debt (in all 
· three models), the lagged local currency-denominated stock market return in Model II 
and the lagged local currency-denominated stock market crises dummy in Model III. The 
inflation rate, overvaluation, the ratio of money supply to reserves and the regional 
market pressure index have positive signs, as expected, and are statistically significant in 
all three models. An increase in those variables increases the probability of currency 
crises. Political stability and the current account to GDP variable both are negative, as 
expected, and statistically significant. A decrease in these variables increases the 
probability of a currency crisis. 
The coefficients associated with the lagged local currency-denominated stock 
market return and the lagged local currency-denominated stock market crises dummy 
variables are not statistically significant, suggesting that the lagged local currency-
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denominates stock market return and crises are not leading indicators of currency crises 
in emerging market economies. 
Table 10b shows the prediction ability of the probit model for currency crises 
with Model I {left side of table) and with Model II (right side of table). We can reach the 
following conclusions from our probit model results: In general, our local and global 
explanatory variables have good explanatory power on dollar denominated stock market 
crises and currency crises. Therefore, both local and global variables appear to be at the 
root of stock market and currency crises. The lagged currency crises are not a leading 
indicator of local currency-denominated and dollar-denominated stock market crises. 
Also, lagged local currency-denominated stock market crises and lagged dollar-
denominated stock market crises are not a good leading indicator of currency crises. 
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Table 1 Oa. Prob it Results and Marginal Effects for Currency Crises with the Local 
Currency-Denominated Stock Market Crises 
Model I Model II Model III 
Variables Estimates Marginal Estimates Marginal Estimates Marginal 
(z-stat.) Effects (z-stat.) Effects (z-stat.) Effects 
Inflation 2.889 0.2043 3.169 0.2248 2.872 0.2031 
Rate (t-1) (2.59)*** (2.40)** (2.57)*** 
Political -0.021 -0.0020 -0.021 -0.0015 -0.021 -0.0015 
Stability (t-1) (-3.6)*** (-3.7)*** (-3.7)*** 
Overvaluation 0.00005 0.000004 0.00005 0.000004 0.00006 0.000004 
(t-1) (2.49)** (2.49)** (2.51)** 
Short Term 0.014 -0.0010 0.015 0.0010 0.015 0.0010 
External Debt (t- (0.95) (0.98) (0.96) 
1) 
Money Supply/ 0.017 0.0012 0.017 0.0012 0.017 0.0012 
Reserves (t-1) (3.10)*** (3.05)*** (2.97)*** 
Current -6.655 -0.4707 -6.584 -0.4670 -6.527 -0.4614 
Account/ GDP (-1.96)** (-1.94)** (-1.92)** 
(t-1) 
0.777 0.0549 0.775 0.0550 0.781 0.0552 
Regional Market (9.44)*** (9.39)*** (9.43)*** 
Pressure Index 
(t-1) 
Stock Market -0.0008 -0.00006 
Return (t-1) (-0.40) 
Stock Market 0.388 0.0375 
Crises (t-1) (1.52) 
Log-Likelihood -205.508 -205.498 -204.342 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 
McFadden-R2 0.26 0.26 0.27 
Number of Obs. 1117 1117 1114 
Number of 77 77 77 
Crises 
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Table 10b. Prediction (Goodness-of -Fit) Ability of the Probit Model 
Currency crises with local currency-denominated stock 
market crises 
Model I Model II 
Predicted Probabilities 
(Cutoff-Points) A B C D A B C D 
20 % cutoff 31 46 52 988 32 45 53 987 
30 % cutoff 23 54 25 1015 24 53 20 1020 
40 % cutoff 16 61 13 1027 16 61 11 1029 
50 % cutoff 13 64 6 1034 13 64 6 1034 
60 % cutoff 12 65 2 1038 11 66 3 1037 
70 % cutoff 10 67 2 1038 9 68 2 1038 
Model I Model II 
Cutoff 
Percentages 
20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 
% of obs. 
correctly 91 93 93 94 94 94 91 93 94 94 94 94 
called 
% of Type I 
and Type II 8.77 7.07 6.62 6.27 6.00 6.18 8.77 6.53 6.53 6.27 6.18 6.27 
errors 
% of crises 
correctly 40 30 21 17 16 13 41 31 21 17 14 12 
called 
% of false 
alarms of 63 52 33 32 14 17 62 45 41 32 21 18 
total alarm 
%prob. of .. 
37 48 67 68 86 cnsis given 83 38 55 59 68 79 82 
an alarm 
%prob. of .. 




0.12 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 
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5.3. Bivariate Probit Model Estimation 
We found significant contemporaneous correlation between the stock market and 
currency crises using descriptive statistics. The probability of a stock market crisis is 
dependent upon currency crisis and vice versa. Therefore, it is possible that the random 
disturbances that affect the currency and stock market crises are correlated and this is a 
violation of the assumptions on which the single equation pro bit analysis is based. We 
estimate a bivariate probit model which allows for correlation of the disturbance of 
currency and stock market crises equations and provides an estimate of the strength of 
this correlation. The bivariate probit model estimates an extra parameter, p, to measure 
the error correlation between currency crises an~ stock market crises in the same sense as 
a seemingly unrelated regression modeL 
Tables 1 la and 12a provide estimates of the coefficients of bivariate probit 
models parameters including an estimate of p and their statistical significances. The 
bivariate probit model results for currency crises models are very similar to the single 
equation probit model results34• All variables in the currency crises model are 
statistically significant except short-term external debt, percentage change of nominal 
exchange rate and stock market return. However, the bivariate probit model results for 
stock market crises show some differences. For instance, industrial production growth 
becomes significant in the local currency-denominated stock market crises model while 
portfolio capital inflows become insignificant. 
The estimate of p in both models indicates highly significant and positive 
relationship between currency crises and stock market crises through disturbance terms. 
34 We compare the bivariate probit model 1 la (12a) with the single equation model in Table 7a (8a) and 9a 
(10a). 
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Therefore, we reject the single equation model in favor of bivariate probit model. The 
estimated correlation between the disturbance terms for currency crises and local 
currency-denominated ( dollar denominated) stock market crises is 0.40 (0.54); this 
suggests a higher correlation between currency crises and dollar denominated stock 
market crises than local currency-denominated stock market crises. Tables 1 lb, l lc, 12b 
and 12c show the predictive ability of bivariate probit models. 
Based on the comparison of the single equation pro bit, Model I, and the bivariate 
probit model I, we can reach the following conclusions35: 
The bivariate probit model I based on dollar-denominated stock market crises has 
a lower percentage of Type I and Type II errors than single equation pro bit model (Model 
I) at all cutoff-point levels. Percentage of crises called correctly (noise-to-signal ratios) is 
higher (lower) in the bivariate probit model I than the single equation probit model 
(Model I) at all cutoff-point levels. The lowest total errors in the bivariate probit model 
is 6.21 percent (at the cutoff-point of 0.40) for dollar-denominated stock market crises 
and 5.94 percent (at the cutoff-point of 0.60) for domestic currency crises, which is lower 
than the single equation probit model. 
The bivariate probit model I based on local currency-denominated stock market 
crises has a lower percentage of Type I and Type II errors than the single equation probit 
model (Model I) at all cutoff-point levels except currency crises at the 50 percent level. 
The percentage of crises called correctly (noise-to-signal ratios) is higher (lower) in the 
bivariate probit model I than the single equation probit model (Model I) at all cutoff-point 
levels except currency crises at the 50 percent level. The lowest total errors in the 
35 We compare the left side (model I) of Tables 7b and 9b with table I lb and left side (model I) of Tables 
8b and 10b with table 12b. 
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bivariate probit model is 6.74 percent (at the cutoff-point of 0.40) for local currency-
denominated stock market crises and 5.93 percent (at the cutoff-point of 0.60) for 
currency crises, which is lower than the single equation probit model. We can conclude 
that the bivariate probit model I have better in sample forecasting ability than single 
equation probit model (Model I). Also, we can reach similar conclusion for the bivariate 
probit model II and single equation probit model (Model II). 
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Table lla. Bivariate Probit Model Results and Marginal Effects: Dollar 
Denominated Stock Market Crises 
Stock Stock 
Market Currency Market 
Crises Crises Crises 
Model I Model I Model II 
Estimates Estimates Estimates 
Variables (z-stat.) (z-stat.) (z-stat.) 
3.031 3.215 
Inflation Rate (t-1) (2.05)** (1.79)* 
-2.907 -2.914 
Ind. Prod. Growth (t-1) (-2.33)** (-2.35)** 
-1.717 -1.725 
Regional Stock Market Index (t-1) (-3.0)*** (-3.0)*** 
-0.566 -0.565 
Portfolio Capital Inflow (t-1) (-2.24)** (-2.21)** 
-0.106 -0.106 
World Stock Market Index (t-1) (-5.2)*** (-5.2)*** 
-0.336 -0.340 
World Output Growth (t-1) (-1.35) (-1.37) 
-0.0004 
% Change of Exchange Rate (t-1) (-0.14) 
2.968 
Inflation Rate (t-1) (2.61)*** 
-0.019 
Political Stability (t-1) (-3.10)*** 
0.00006 
Overvaluation (t-1) (3.05)*** 
0.017 
Short Term External Debt (t-1) (1.11) 
0.016 
Money Supply/ Reserves (t-1) (3.34)*** 
-6.771 
Current Account/ GDP (t-1) (-2.05)** 
0.697 
Regional Market Pressure (7.93)*** 
Index(t-1) 
Stock Market Return (t-1) 
























Continues from Table lla. 
Log-Likelihood -420.319 -419.756 
Number of Observation 1111 1111 1111 1111 
McFadden-R2 20 20 
Number of Crises 70 76 70 76 
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Table llb. Prediction (Goodness-of -Fit) Ability of Bivariate Probit Model I 
The dollar-denominated 
stock market crises Currency crises 
Predicted Probabilities 
(Cutoff-Points) A B C D A B C D 
20 % cutoff 24 46 32 1009 32 44 51 984 
30 % cutoff 11 59 11 1030 24 52 19 1016 
40 % cutoff 5 65 4 1037 16 60 9 1026 
50 % cutoff 2 68 3 1038 13 63 4 1031 
60 % cutoff 0 70 0 1041 12 64 2 1033 
70 % cutoff 10 66 2 1033 
The dollar-denominated 
stock market crises Currency crises 
Cut off 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 
Percentages 
% of observations 
93 94 94 94 94 91 94 94 94 94 94 
correctly called 
% of Type I and 
7.02 6.30 6.21 6.39 6.30 8.56 6.39 6.21 6.03 5.94 6.12 
Type II errors 
% of crises 
34 16 7 3 0 42 32 21 17 16 13 
correctly called 
% of false alarms 
57 50 44 60 61 44 36 24 14 17 
of total alarm 
% probabilities of 
cns1s given an 43 50 56 40 39 56 64 76 86 83 
alarm 
% probabilities of 
cns1s given no 4.4 5.4 5.9 6.1 4.3 4.9 5.4 5.8 5.8 6.0 
alarm 
Noise-to-signal 
0.10 0.11 0.11 0.15 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 
ratio 
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Table llc. Prediction (Goodness-of -Fit) Ability of Bivariate Probit Model II 
The dollar-denominated 
stock market crises Currency crises 
Predicted Probabilities 
(Cutoff-Points) 
20 % cutoff 
30 % cutoff 
40 % cutoff 
50 % cutoff 
60 % cutoff 
70 % cutoff 
Cut off 
Percentages 
% of observations 
correctly called 
% of Type I and 
Type II errors 
% of crises 
correctly called 
% of false alarms 
of total alarm 
% probabilities of 
A B C 
23 47 33 
9 61 11 
5 65 5 
2 68 3 
0 70 0 
The dollar-denominated 







A B C D 
32 44 52 983 
24 52 19 1016 
16 60 9 1026 
12 64 5 1030 
12 64 3 1032 
10 66 3 1032 
Currency crises 
20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 
93 94 94 94 94 91 94 94 94 94 94 
7.20 6.48 6.30 6.39 6.30 8.64 6.39 6.21 6.03 5.94 6.12 
33 13 7 3 0 42 32 21 16 16 13 
59 55 50 60 61 44 36 29 20 23 
crisis given an 41 45 50 40 39 56 64 71 80 77 
alarm 
% probabilities of .. 




4.5 5.6 5.9 6.1 4.3 4.9 5.4 5.9 5.8 6.0 
0.10 0.12 0.12 0.15 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.08 
93 
Table 12a. Bivariate Probit Model Results and Marginal Effects: Local Currency 
Denominated Stock Market Crises 
Stock Stock 
Market Currency Market Currency 
Crises Crises Crises Crises 
Model I Model I Model II Model II 
Estimates Estimates Estimates Estimates 
Variables (z-stat.) (z-stat.) (z-stat.) (z-stat.) 
2.456 2.594 
Inflation Rate (t-1) (1.65)* (1.28) 
-2.263 -2.298 
Ind. Prod. Growth (t-1) (-1.74)* (-1.74)* 
-2.106 -2.113 
Regional Stock Market Index (t-1) (-4.0)*** (-4.1)*** 
-0.418 -0.418 
Portfolio Capital Inflow (t-1) (-1.32) (-1.32) 
-0.124 -0.124 
World Stock Market Index (t-1) (-6.3)*** (-6.3)*** 
-0.117 -0.119 
World Output Growth (t-1) (-0.47) (-0.48) 
-0.0003 
% Change of Exchange Rate (t-1) (-0.08) 
2.681 3.227 
Inflation Rate (t-1) (l.83)* (2.08)** 
-0.020 -0.019 
Political Stability (t-1) (-3.15)*** (-3.0)*** 
0.00006 0.00006 
Overvaluation (t-1) (3.13)*** (3.16)*** 
0.017 0.018 
Short Term External Debt (t-1) (1.10) (1.14) 
0.016 0.016 
Money Supply/ Reserves (t-1) (3.13)*** (2.96)*** 
-6.069 -5.865 
Current Account/ GDP (t-1) (-1.82)* (-1.76)* 
0.742 0.736 
Regional Market Pressure (8.66)*** C (8.48)*** 
Index (t-1) 
-0.002 
Stock Market Return (t-1) (-0.86) 
p 0.407 0.420 
(3.46)*** (3.48)*** 
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Continues from Table 12a. 
Log-Likelihood -432.590 -432.229 
Number of Observation 1113 1113 1113 1113 
Mcfadden-R2 20 20 
Number of Crises 73 76 73 76 
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Table 12b. Prediction (Goodness-of -Fit) Ability of Bivariate Probit Model I 
The local currency-
denominated stock market Currency crises 
cnses 
Predicted Probabilities 
(Cutoff-Points) A B C D A B C D 
20 %cutoff 18 55 34 1006 33 43 51 986 
30 % cutoff 8 65 12 1028 23 53 18 1019 
40 % cutoff 5 68 7 1033 16 60 10 1027 
50 % cutoff 2 71 5 1035 12 64 6 1031 
60 % cutoff 0 73 4 1036 12 64 2 1035 
70 % cutoff 10 66 2 1035 
The local currency-
denominated stock market Currency crises 
cnses 
Cut off Percentages 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 
% of observations 
92 93 93 93 93 92 94 94 94 94 94 
correctly called 
% of Type I and 
8.00 6.92 6.74 6.83 6.92 8.45 6.38 6.29 6.29 5.93 6.11 
Type II errors 
% of crises 
25 11 7 3 0 43 30 21 16 16 13 
correctly called 
% of false alarms of 
65 60 58 71 100 61 44 38 33 14 17 
total alarm 
% probabilities of 
cns1s given an 35 40 42 29 0 39 56 62 67 86 83 
alarm 
% probabilities of 
crisis given no 5.2 6.1 6.2 6.4 4.2 4.9 5.5 5.8 5.8 6.0 
alarm 
Noise-to-signal 
0.15 0.15 0.15 0.22 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.07 
ratio 
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Table 12c. Prediction (Goodness-of-Fit) Ability of Bivariate Probit Model II 
The local currency-
denominated stock market Currency crises 
cnses 
Predicted Probabilities 
(Cutoff-Points) A B C D A B C D 
20 % cutoff 18 55 33 1007 32 44 52 985 
30 % cutoff 7 66 13 1027 24 52 18 1019 
40 % cutoff 5 68 7 1033 16 60 10 1027 
50 % cutoff 2 71 5 1035 12 64 6 1031 
60 % cutoff 0 73 4 1036 12 64 3 1034 
70 % cutoff 10 66 3 1034 
The local currency-
denominated stock market Currency crises 
cnses 
Cut off Percentages 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 
% of observations 
92 93 93 93 93 91 94 94 94 94 94 
correctly called 
% of Type I and 
7.90 7.09 6.74 6.83 6.92 8.62 6.29 6.29 6.29 6.01 6.20 
Type II errors 
% of crises 
25 10 7 3 0 42 32 21 16 16 13 
correctly called 
% of false alarms of 
65 65 58 71 100 62 43 38 33 20 23 
total alarm 
% probabilities of 
crisis given an 35 35 42 29 0 38 57 62 67 80 77 
alarm 
% probabilities of .. 
5.2 6.1 6.2 6.4 cns1s given no 4.3 4.9 5.5 5.8 5.8 6.0 
alarm 
Noise-to~signal 
0.15 0.17 0.15 0.22 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.08 
ratio 
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5.4. Simultaneous Equation Probit Model Estimations 
Results from bivariate probit models indicate that currency crises and stock 
market crises are linked through their correlated errors. Even if the bivariate probit 
models provide a clear indication of the degree to which currency crises and stock market 
crises are related, these models do not provide guidance in determining causal direction. 
Therefore, single equation and bivariate probit models serve as a preliminary tool in an 
investigation of the currency and stock market crises relationship. In order to correct for 
possible endogeneity bias and obtain consistent estimates of the direct effects of currency 
crises on stock market crises and of stock market crises on currency crises, we need to 
employ techniques that account for the simultaneous nature of the relationship. To 
overcome the above problems, we employ a simultaneous equation probit model where 
stock market and currency crises are treated as endogenous variables. 
5.4.1. Simultaneous Equation Probit Model Estimation for Dollar 
Denominated Stock Market Crises and Currency Crises 
Table 13a reports the regression results of the dollar-denominated stock market 
crises and currency crises based on simultaneous equation probit model with the onset of 
a set of local and global control variables. 
The results from the simultaneous equation model are similar to the single 
equation probit model II and the bivariate model II except that the world output growth 
becomes significant while the inflation rate insignificant in the stock crises modeL All 
variables are statistically significant in the dollar-denominated stock market crisis 
equation, except for inflation rate. Also, all variables have the expected signs. 
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Industrial production growth is significant and positive, as expected, in the dollar-
denominated stock market crises equation. A one percentage point decrease in industrial 
production growth raises the probability of a dollar-denominated stock market crisis by 
0.19 percentage point. A decrease in the world output growth, regional stock market 
returns, world stock market return and portfolio capital inflow increases the probability of 
dollar-denominated stock market crises. 
All variables are statistically significant and have the expected signs in the 
currency crisis equation except short-term external debt variable. An increase in the 
inflation rate, overvaluation of the real exchange rate, money supply to reserve ratio and 
the regional market pressure index increase the probability of a currency crisis. While an 
increase in political stability and current account to the GDP ratio will decrease the 
probability of a currency crisis. 
Finally, the coefficient for the contemporaneous currency crisis and dollar-
denominated stock market crisis variables show that a one percentage point increase in 
the contemporaneous probability of currency crises raises the probability of a dollar-
denominated stock market crisis by 0.037 percentage point (significant at the 1 percent 
level) and a one percentage point increase in the contemporaneous probability of dollar-
denominated stock market crises, raises the probability of a currency crises by 0.020 
percentage point (significant at the 5 percent level). This is evidence that stock market 
crises should be treated as an endogenous in currency crises model and currency crises 
should be treated as an endogenous variable in the stock market crises model. Therefore, 
a simultaneous equation probit model is an appropriate model. 
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Table 13b shows the prediction ability of simultaneous equation pro bit model for 
dollar-denominated stock market crises and currency crises. Based on a comparison of 
the predictive ability of the single equation pro bit model II and the simultaneous equation 
probit model, we reach following conclusions36: 
The simultaneous equation probit model, based on dollar-denominated stock 
market crisis, have a lower percentage of Type I and Type II errors than the single 
equation probit model (Model II) at all cutoff-point levels. The percentage of crises 
correctly predicted (noise-to-signal ratios) is higher (lower) in the simultaneous equation 
probit model than in the single equation probit model (Model II) at all cutoff-point levels. 
The lowest total error rate in the simultaneous equation pro bit model is 6.12 percent ( at 
the cutoff-point of 0.40) for dollar-denominated stock market crises and 6.03 percent (at 
the cutoff-point of 0.40) for domestic currency crises, which is lower than the single 
equation probit model. 
Also, the simultaneous equation probit model has a lower percentage of Type I 
and Type II errors than the bivariate probit model II at all cutoff-point levels except the 
50 and 60 percent levels in currency crises37. The percentage of crises correctly predicted 
(noise-to-signal ratios) is higher (lower) in the simultaneous equation probit model than 
the bivariate probit model in all cutoff-point levels except the 60 percent level in currency 
cnses. 
We can conclude that the simultaneous equation model based on dollar-
denominated stock market crises has better forecasting ability than single equation probit 
model II and bivariate probit model II. 
36 We compare the right side of tables 7b and 9b with Table 13b. 
37 We compare the table 1 lc with table 13b. 
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Table 13a. Simultaneous Equation Probit Results and Marginal Effects 
Dollar-denominated Currency Crises 
stock market crises 
Estimates Marginal Estimates Marginal 
Variables (z-stat.) Effects (z-stat.) Effects 
1.793 0.1334 
Inflation Rate (t-1) (1.20)) 
-2.639 -0.1964 
Ind. Prod. Growth (t-1) (-1.73)* 
-1.189 -0.0884 
Regional Stock Market Index (t-1) (-1.94)** 
-0.376 -0.0280 
Portfolio Capital Inflow (t-1) (-1.87)* 
-0.130 -0.0097 
World Stock Market Index (t-1) (-5.4)*** 
-0.554 -0.0412 
· World Output Growth (t-1) (-2.28)** 
0.501 0.0372 
Currency Crises (t) (6.03)*** 
2.345 0.1598 
Inflation (t-1) (1.67)* 
-0.018 -0.0012 
Political Stability (t-1) (-3.08)*** 
0.00004 0.000004 
Overvaluation (t-1) (2.20)** 
0.020 0.0013 
Short Term External Debt (t-1) (0.95) 
0.017 0.0011 
Money Supply/ Reserves (t-1) (2.34)** 
-6.186 -0.4216 
Current Account/ GDP (t-1) (-1.99)** 
0.657 0.0447 
Regional Market Pressure (7.85)*** 
Index (t-1) 
0.292 0.0199 
Stock Market Crises (t) (2.15)** 
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Continues from Table 13a 
Log-Likelihood -209.183 -202.672 
p-value for overall significance 0.0000 0.0000 
McFadden-R2 0.20 0.26 
Number of Observation 1111 1111 
Number of Crises 70 76 
102 
Table 13b. Prediction (Goodness-of -Fit) Ability of Simultaneous Equation Probit 
Model 
Dollar-denominated stock Currency crises 
market crises 
Predicted Probabilities 
(Cutoff-Points) A B C D A B C D 
20 % cutoff 29 41 37 1004 38 38 52 983 
30 % cutoff 13 57 12 1029 26 50 20 1015 
40 % cutoff 10 60 8 1033 19 57 10 1025 
50 % cutoff 3 67 5 1036 13 63 5 1030 
60 % cutoff 2 68 2 1039 12 64 4 1031 
70 % cutoff 10 66 2 1033 
Dollar-denominated stock Currency crises 
market crises 
Cutoff Percentages 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 
% of observations 
93 94 94 94 94 92 93 94 94 94 94 
correctly called 
% of Type I and 
7.02 6.21 6.12 6.39 6.30 8.10 6.30 6.03 6.12 6.12 6.12 
Type II errors 
% of crises 
41 19 14 4 3 50 34 25 17 16 13 
correctly called 
% of false alarms of 
56 48 44 57 50 58 43 34 28 25 17 
total alarm 
% probabilities of 
.. 
44 52 56 43 50 42 57 66 72 75 83 cns1s given an 
alarm 
% probabilities of 
.. 
3.9 5.2 5.5 6.1 6.1 3.7 4.7 5.3 5.8 5.8 6.0 cnsis given no 
alarm 
Noise-to-signal 
0.09 0.10 0.10 0.14 .12 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 
ratio 
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5.4.2. Simultaneous Equation Probit Model Estimation for Local Currency 
Denominated Stock Market Crises and Currency Crises 
Table 14a reports the results of the local currency-denominated stock market 
crises and currency crises based on the simultaneous equation probit model with the set 
oflocal and global control variables. 
The simultaneous equation probit model results for currency crises are similar to 
the single equation (Model II) and the bivariate probit model II results. However, the 
simultaneous equation probit model results for stock market crises show some 
differences. All variables have the expected signs and the regional stock market return, 
world stock market return and portfolio capital inflow are statistically significant in the 
local currency-denominated stock market crises model. The inflation rate, political 
stability, overvaluation, ratio of money supply to reserves, ratio of the current account to 
GDP and the regional market pressure index are statistically significant in the currency 
crises model. 
Decreases in the regional stock market return, world stock market return and 
portfolio capital inflows increase the probability of a local currency-dominated stock 
market crisis. An increase in the inflation rate, overvaluation, money supply to reserve 
ratio and the regional market pressure index, increases the probability of a currency 
crisis. An increase in political stability and the current account to GDP ratio, decrease 
the probability of a currency crisis. 
Finally, the coefficient of currency crisis and local currency-dominated stock 
market crisis variables show that a one percentage point increase in the contemporaneous 
probability of currency crises raises the probability of a local currency-dominated stock 
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market crises by 0.018 percentage point (significant at the 1 percent level) and a one 
percentage point increase in the contemporaneous probability of a local currency-
dominated stock market crises raises the probability of a currency crises by 0.014 
percentage point (significant at the 10 percent level). This result suggests that there is 
contemporaneous correlation between stock market and currency crises in emerging 
market economies, even when controlling for an endogeneity bias and other explanatory 
variables. 
Table 14b shows the predictive ability of simultaneous equation probit model for 
the local currency-denominated stock market crises and currency crises. 
Based on the comparison of the prediction ability of single equation pro bit model 
II and simultaneous equation probit model, we reach following conclusions38 : 
Simultaneous equation probit model based on local currency-denominated stock market 
crises have a lower percentage of Type I and Type II errors than the single equation 
probit model (Model 11) at all cutoff-point levels. The percentage of crises correctly 
predicted (noise-to-signal ratios) is higher (lower) in the simultaneous equation probit 
model than the single equation probit model (Model 11) at all cutoff-point levels except 
the 50 percent level. The lowest total errors in the simultaneous equation probit model is 
6.56 percent (at the cutoff-point of 0.50) for dollar-denominated stock market crises and 
6.02 percent (at the cutoff-point of 0.60) for currency crises, which is lower than the 
single equation probit model. 
The simultaneous equation prob it model has a lower percentage of Type I and 
Type II errors than the bivariate probit model II at all cutoff-point levels, except the 20 
38 We compare the right side of tables Sb and 10b with table 14b. 
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percent level in stock market crises and 60 percent level in currency crises39• The 
percentage of crises correctly predicted (noise-to-signal ratios) is higher (lower) in the 
simultaneous equation probit model than the bivariate probit model in all cutoff-point 
levels. 
We conclude that the simultaneous equation model based on local currency-
denominated stock market crises has better forecasting ability than the single equation 
probit model and bivariate probit model. 
Based on our results in this section, we reach following conclusions: First, there 
is a significant simultaneous causality between stock market and currency crises in 
emerging market economies. Second, the effect of the currency crises on the stock 
market crises is larger (in terms of probability) than the effect of stock market crises 
currency crises. Third, the predictive ability of currency crisis is higher than the 
predictive ability of stock market crisis. Finally, the explanatory power and the 
predictive ability of the dollar-denominated stock market crisis model are higher than the 
predictive ability of the local currency-denominated stock market crisis model. 
39 We compare table 12c with table 14b. 
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Table 14a. Simultaneous Equation ProbitResults and Marginal Effects 
The local currency-
denominated stock Currency Crises 
market crises 
Estimates Marginal Estimates Marginal 
Variables (z-stat.) Effects (z-stat.) Effects 
1.715 0.1586 
Inflation Rate ( t-1) (1.35) 
-1.861 -0.1722 
Ind. Prod. Growth (t-1) (-1.35) 
-1.860 -0.1720 
Regional Stock Market Index (t-1) (-3.5)*** 
-0.340 -0.0314 
Portfolio Capital Inflow (t-1) (-1.61)* 
-0.133 -0.0120 
World Stock Market Index (t-1) (-6.3)*** 
-0.202 -0.0186 
World Output Growth (t-1) (-0.92) 
0.202 0.0180 
Currency Crises ( t) (2.72)*** 
2.527 0.1756 
Inflation (t-1) (2.55)*** 
-0.021 -0.0014 
Political Stability (t-1) (-3.99)*** 
0.00006 0.000004 
Overvaluation (t-1) (2.17)** 
0.019 0.0013 
Short Tenn External Debt (t-1) (0.93) 
0.017 0.0011 
Money Supply/ Reserves (t-1) (2.33)** 
-5.957 -0.4140 
Current Account/ GDP (t-1) (-2.02)** 
0.739 0.0513 
Regional Market Pressure (10.8)*** 
Index (t-1) 
0.209 0.0145 
Stock Market Crises (t) (1.74)* 
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Continues from Table 14a 
Log-Likelihood -229.934 -205.80 
p-value for overall significance 0.0000 0.0000 
McFadden-R2 0.14 0.26 
Number of Observation 1113 1113 
Number of Crises 73 76 
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Table 14b. Prediction (Goodness-of -Fit) Ability of Simultaneous Equation Probit 
Model 
The local currency-
denominated stock market Currency crises 
cnses 
Predicted Probabilities 
(Cutoff-Points) A B C D A B C D 
20 % cutoff 20 53 38 1002 35 41 52 985 
30 % cutoff 8 65 12 1028 24 52 17 1020 
40 % cutoff 7 66 8 1032 16 60 9 1028 
50 % cutoff 4 69 5 1035 12 64 5 1032 
60 % cutoff 2 71 3 1037 12 64 3 1034 
70 % cutoff 10 66 2 1035 
The local currency-
denominated stock market Currency crises 
cnses 
Cutoff Percentages 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 
% of observations 92 93 93 93 93 92 94 94 94 94 94 
correctly called 
% of Type I and 
8.17 6.92 6.65 6.56 6.64 8.35 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.02 6.11 
Type II errors 
% of crises 
27 11 10 6 3 46 32 21 16 16 13 
correctly called 
% of false alarms of 
66 60 53 55 60 60 41 36 29 20 17 
total alarm 
% probabilities of .. 
34 40 47 45 40 40 59 64 71 80 83 cns1s given an 
alarm 
% probabilities of 
cns1s given no 5.0 6.1 6.0 6.3 6.4 4.0 4.9 5.5 5.8 5.8 6.0 
alarm 
Noise-to-signal 
0.15 0.15 0.13 0.14 0.16 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.7 0.7 
ratio 
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5.5. Predicted Probabilities of Crises 
In figures 2 and 3, the solid line shows the predicted probabilities of dollar-
denominated stock market crises and currency crises based on the simultaneous equation 
pro bit model and the line show the date of the crises according to our definitions. We 
selected 9 countries from Latin America, Asia and Europe. 
Based on the figures, we can conclude that the stock market and currency crises 
model does fit for the Asian crises in 1997-1998 fairly well. The predicted probabilities 
of the stock market crises range from 45 to 80 percent and the predicted probabilities of 
currency crises range from 80 to 100 percent during the 1997-1998 periods in Asia. 
With regard to currency crises in 1990-1992, the corresponding probabilities are 
high in Europe. Also, the probabilities of stock market crises are high in 1990-1992 in 
Latin America, as seen in Figure 2. 
With regard to the Latin American crises in 1994-95, corresponding probabilities 
are not very high. Finally, the 2000-2001 crises best fit for Turkey and Greece. 
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Figure 2. Predicted Probabilities of Dollar-Denominated Stock Market Crises 
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5.6. Results Based on Out-Of-Sample Forecasts 
In this section, we test the predictive ability of our models by estimating the 
model on a restricted period 1984:1-1999:4 and computing an out-of-sample forecast for 
the remaining eight quarters. As a first step, the coefficients were estimated after the last 
eight quarters (2000:1 and 2001:4) in the sample are excluded. The results of these out of 
sample estimates are shown in Tables 15a, 16a 17a, 18a and 19a. For the most part, the 
results do not differ from the full sample estimates. In the second step, fitted 
probabilities for the excluded quarters are computed based on the estimated coefficients 
of the out of sample model40. Finally, these probabilities are used to predict crises for the 
excluded quarters. Table 15b and 16b shows the goodness-of-fit statistics obtained using 
these steps. The model has some success in forecasting stock market crises and limited 
success in forecasting currency crises. Table 15b compares the forecasting ability of 
single equation probit model II (SEM II), bivariate probit model II (BVM 11), and 
simultaneous equation probit model (SEM) for dollar-denomidated stock market crises 
and currency crises. Based on our results from Table 15b, we can conclude that the 
simultaneous equation probit model has better forecasting ability than single equation 
probit model II and bivariate probit model II. For instance, the percentage of stock 
market crises correctly forecasted (Type I and Type II errors) is higher (lower) in 
40 Only significant coefficients are used. 
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simultaneous equation model than the single equation probit model II at all cutoff-point 
levels and than bivariate brobit model II at all cutoff-point levels except 20 percent level. 
Table 16b compares the forecasting ability of single equation probit model II (SEM II), 
bivariate probit model II (BVM II), and simultaneous equation probit model (SEM) for 
local currency-denominated stock market crises and currency crises. 
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Table 15a. Out of Sample Single Equation Probit Model Results for Stock 
Market Crises 
Dollar-Denominated Stock Local Currency-Denominated 
Variables Market Crises Stock Market Crises 
Model I Model II Model I Model II 
Estimates Estimates Estimates Estimates 
(z-stat.) (z-stat.) (z-stat.) (z-stat.) 
Inflation 1.994 1.114 2.028 2.219 
Rate (t-1) (1.58) (0.71) (1.59) (1.27) 
Industrial -2.156 -2.173 -1.896 -1.900 
Production Growth (-1.49) (-1.51) (-1.34) (-1.34) 
(t-1) 
Regional Stock -1.443 -1.433 -1.832 -1.835 
Market Return (t-1) (-2.58)*** (-2.56)*** (-3.37)*** (-3.37)*** 
Portfolio Capital -0.628 -0.612 -0.479 -0.482 
Inflows (t-1) (-2.8)*** (-2.77)*** (-2.11)** (-2.11)** 
World Stock -0.109 -0.110 -0.138 -0.138 
Market Return (t-1) (-4.80)*** (-4.82)*** (-6.07)*** (-6.05)*** 
World Output -0.252 -0.261 -0.226 -0.225 
Growth (t-1) (-1.02) (-1.04) (-0.90) (-0.89) 
%Change of 0.002 
Nominal Exchange (0.92) 
Rate (t-1) 
Currency Crises -0.0005 
Dummy(t-1) (-0.16) 
Log-Likelihood -198.949 -198.543 -196.472 -196.459 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
McFadden-R2 0.11 0.11 0.14 0.14 
Number of Obs. 987 987 989 989 
Number of Crises 59 59 61 61 
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Table 16a. Out of Sample Single Eguation Probit Model Results for 
Currency Crises 
Currency Crises with Currency Crises with Local 
Dollar-Denominated Currency-Denominated 
Stock Market Crises Stock Market Crises 
Model I Model II Model I Model II 
Variables 
Estimates Estimates Estimates Estimates 
(z-stat.) (z-stat.) (z-stat.) (z-stat.) 
Inflation Rate (t-1) 3.022 3.136 3.022 3.189 
(2.68)*** (2.72)*** (2.68)*** (2.40)** 
Political Stability -0.021 -0.021 -0.021 -0.021 
(t-1) (-3.42)*** (-3.42)*** (-3.42)*** (-3.40)*** 
Overvaluation (t-1) 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 
(1.92)* (1.96)** (1.92)* (1.93)* 
Short Term Extern.al 0.015 0.014 0.015 0.015 
Debt (t-1) (0.97) (0.93) (0.97) (0.99) 
Money Supply/ 0.017 0.016 0.017 0.017 
Reserves (t-1) (3.03)*** (2.96)*** (3.03)*** (2.99)*** 
Current Account/ -6.914 -6.657 -6.914 -6.850 
GDP (t-1) (-1.93)* (-1.85)* (-1.93)* (-1.91)* 
Regional Market 0.774 0.770 0.774 0.773 
Pressure Index (t-1) (8.88)*** (8.08)*** (8.88)*** (8.85)*** 
Stock Market -0.002 -0.0004 
Return (t-1) (-0.76) (-0.23) 
Log-Likelihood -181.439 -181.137 -181.439 -181.410 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
McFadden-R2 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 
Number of Obs. 983 983 983 983 
Number of Crises 69 69 69 69 
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Table 17a. Bivariate Probit Model Results : Dollar Denominated Stock Market 
Crises 
Stock Stock 
Market Currency Market Currency 
Crises Crises Crises Crises 
Model I Model I Model II Model II 
Estimates Estimates Estimates Estimates 
Variables (z-stat.) (z-stat.) (z-stat.) (z-stat.) 
2.717 3.012 
Inflation Rate (t-1) (1.81)* (1.65)* 
-2.459 -2.509 
Ind. Prod. Growth ( t-1) (-1.87)* (-1.86)* 
-1.576 -1.575 
Regional Stock Market Index (t-1) (-2.6)*** (-2.59)*** 
-0.508 -0.508 
Portfolio Capital Inflow (t-1) (-1.88)* (-1.87)* 
-0.105 -0.104 
World Stock Market Index (t-1) (-4.6)*** (-4.57)*** 
-0.313 -0.316 
World Output Growth (t-1) (-1.09) (-1.10) 
-0.0006 
% Change of Exchange Rate (t-1) (-0.22) 
3.080 3.224 
Inflation Rate (t-1) (2.65)*** (2.59)*** 
-0.019 -0.019 
Political Stability (t-1) (-2.89)*** (-2.8)*** 
0.0001 0.0001 
Overvaluation (t-1) (1.00) (1.01) 
0.016 0.015 
Short Term External Debt (t-1) (1.05) (0.98) 
0.017 0.016 
Money Supply/ Reserves (t-1) (3.32)*** (3.11)*** 
-7.307 -6.647 
Current Account/ GDP (t-1) (-2.04)** (-1.86)* 
0.698 0.687 
Regional Market Pressure (7.59)*** (7.26)*** 
Index (t-1) 
-0.004 
Stock Market Return (t-1) (-1.28) 
p 0.542 0.561 
(5.57)*** (5.58)*** 
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Continues from Table 17a. 
Log-Likelihood -362.131 -361.003 
Number of Observation 978 978 978 978 
McFadden-R2 21 21 
Number of Crises 57 68 57 68 
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Table 18a. Bivariate Probit Model Results: Local Currency Denominated Stock 
Market Crises 
Stock Stock 
Market Currency Market Currency 
Crises Crises Crises Crises 
Model I Model I Model II Model II 
Estimates Estimates Estimates Estimates 
Variables (z-stat.) (z-stat.) (z-stat.) (z-stat.) 
2.424 2.552 
Inflation Rate ( t-1) (1.64)* (1.20) 
-2.302 -2.329 
Ind. Prod. Growth ( t-1) (-1.71)* (-1.71)* 
-1.912 -1.918 
Regional Stock Market Index (t-1) (-3.4)*** (-3.4)*** 
-0.392 -0.392 
Portfolio Capital Inflow (t-1) (-1.19) (-1.18) 
-0.134 -0.134 
World Stock Market Index (t-1) (-5.9)*** (-5.9)*** 
-0.214 -0.215 
World Output Growth (t-1) (-0.69) (-0.68) 
-0.0003 
% Change of Exchange Rate (t-1) (-0.07) 
2.798 3.212 
Inflation Rate (t-1) (1.88)* (2.06)** 
-0.020 -0.020 
Political Stability (t-1) (-2.93)*** (-2.8)*** 
0.0002 0.0002 
Overvaluation ( t-1) (1.74)* (1.76)* 
0.017 0.018 
Short Term External Debt (t-1) (1.09) (1.10) 
0.016 0.016 
Money Supply/ Reserves (t-1) (3.06)*** (2.85)*** 
-6.314 -6.101 
Current Account/ GDP (t-1) (-1.76)* (-1.69)* 
0.734 0.730 
Regional Market Pressure (8.17)*** (8.02)*** 
Index (t-1) 
-0.001 
Stock Market Return ( t-1) (-0.62) 
p 0.447 0.457 
(3.84)*** (3.48)*** 
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Continues from Table 18a. 
Log-Likelihood -368.687 -368.484 
Number of Observation 980 980 980 980 
McFadden-R2 21 21 
Number of Crises 60 68 60 68 
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Table 19a. Simultaneous Equation Probit Results 
Dollar- Currency Local Currency 
denominated Crises Currency- Crises 
stock market . denominated 
crises stock market 
crises 
Estimates Estimates Estimates Estimates 
Variables (z-stat.) (z-stat.) (z-stat.) (z-stat.) 
1.477 1.754 
Inflation Rate (t-1) (1.04) (1.35) 
Industrial Production -2.0882 -1.851 
Growth (t-1) (-1.40) (-1.30) 
Regional Stock Market -1.347 -1.762 
Index (t-1) (-2.33)** (-3.2)*** 
-0.391 -0.353 
Portfolio Capital Inflow (t-1) (-1.89)* (-1.65)* 
-0.114 -0.13 
World Stock Market Index (t- (-4.8)*** (-6.1)*** 
1) 
-0.455 -0.295 
World Output Growth (t-1) (-1.80)* (-1.20)** 
0.346 0.149 
Currency Crises ( t) (4.55)*** (2.04)** 
2.357 2.545 
Inflation (t-1) (1.62)* (2.69)*** 
-0.017 -0.021 
Political Stability (t-1) (-2.67)*** (-3.6)*** 
0.0002 0.0002 
Overvaluation (t-1) (2.66)*** (2.93)*** 
0.020 0.020 
Short Term External Debt (t-1) (0.90) (0.94) 
0.016 0.016 
Money Supply/ Reserves (t-1) (2.15)** (2.18)** 
-5.990 -5.571 
Current Account/ GDP (t-1) (-1.81)* (-1.76)* 
Regional Market Pressure 0.6171 0.723 
Index (t-1) (6.66)*** (9.85)*** 
0.3737 0.242 
Stock Market Crises (t) (2.54)** (1.95)** 
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Log-Likelihood -181.316 -177.909 -191.967 -179.759 
p-value for overall significance 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
McFadden-R2 0.16 0.28 0.14 0.27 
Number of Observation 978 978 980 980 
Number of Crises 57 68 60 68 
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Table 15b. Prediction (Goodness-of -Fit) Ability of Out of Sample Model 
Dollar-denominated stock Currency crises 
market crises 
Cutoff Percentag:es 10% 20% 30% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 
% of observations 
correctly called (SEM m 78 90 92 91 92 93 93 93 
% of observations 
correctly called(BVM II) 78 92 93 93 94 95 95 95 
% of observations 
correctly called (SEM) 80 90 93 95 95 95 95 95 
% of crises correctly called 
(SEM II) 83 17 8 25 25 25 25 25 
% of crises correctly called 
(BVMII) 83 67 17 25 25 25 25 25 
% of crises correctly called 
(SEM) 92 64 27 37 25 25 25 25 
% of Type I and Type II 
errors (SEM II) 0.22 0.10 0.080 0.083 0.069 0.061 0.061 0.061 
% of Type I and Type II 
errors (BVM II) 0.21 O.Q9 0.o75 0.069 0.061 0.053 0.053 0.053 
% of Type I and Type II 
errors (SEM) 0.20 0.10 0.o75 0.054 0.061 0.053 0.053 0.053 
Table 16b. Prediction (Goodness-of -Fit) Ability of Out of Sample Model 
Local Currency- Currency crises 
denominated stock market 
crises 
Cutoff Percentages 10% 20% 30% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 
% of observations 
correctly called (SEM II) 76 88 92 92 94 94 94 94 
% of observations 
correctly called(BVM ID 76 88 93 95 95 95 95 95 
% of observations 
correctly called (SEM) 78 90 93 95 95 95 95 95 
% of crises correctly called 
(SEM II) 82 27 9 38 25 25 25 25 
% of crises correctly called 
(BVMII) 82 27 9 38 25 25 25 25 
% of crises correctly called 
(SEM) 91 36 9 38 25 25 25 25 
% of Type I and Type II 
errors (SEM II) 0.24 0.11 0.074 0.068 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.061 
% of Type I and Type II 
errors (BVM II) 0.23 0.11 0.074 0.046 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.054 
% of Type I and Type II 
errors (SEM) 0.25 0.13 0.074 0.046 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.054 
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CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The main purpose of this dissertation is to identify the determinants of stock 
market and currency crises, and to investigate the direction of causality between the two 
crises in emerging markets over the 1984-2001 periods. In order to do that, we use 
descriptive statistics, three versions of a single equation probit model, a bivariate probit 
model, and a simultaneous equations probit model. 
First, the descriptive statistic analysis shows that the number and annual average 
( frequency) of stock market and "twin" crises have increased ( decreased) over time while 
the number, average per year and frequency of currency crises tends to be stable. Over 
time increases in stock market crises can be explained by increases in stock market 
capitalization, trading and integration. Increases in "twin" crises are a result of increases 
in stock market crises. Also, descriptive statistic analysis indicates that most stock 
market and currency crises tend to occur simultaneously rather than one leading the other. 
This can be seen as evidence in favor of the existence of contemporaneous relationship 
between stock market and currency crises. 
To identify the determinants of stock market and currency crises and to test the 
results from descriptive statistics, we estimate stock market and currency crises using a 
single equation probit model. The results from the estimated stock market crisis models 
show that the inflation rate, industrial production growth, portfolio capital inflow, 
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regional stock market index and world stock market index are significant factors 
explaining stock market crises. Of importance, the coefficient associated with the lagged 
currency crisis is insignificant, indicating that currency crises are not a leading indicator 
of stock market crises. 
The results from the estimated currency crisis model show that the inflation rate, 
political stability, real exchange rate overvaluation, the short term external debt to 
reserves ratio, money supply to reserves ratio, current account to GDP ratio and the 
regional market pressure are significant factors explaining stock market crises. In 
addition, the coefficient associated with the lagged stock market crises variable is 
insignificant, suggesting that a stock market crisis is not a leading indicator of a currency 
crisis. Also, goodness-of-fit statistics shows that the predictive ability of the dollar-
denominated stock market crisis model is higher than the predictive ability of the local 
currency-denominated stock market crisis model. 
To investigate the correlation of error terms between stock market and currency 
crises, a bivariate probit model is estimated. The results show a highly significant, 
positive error term correlation between the two. The estimated correlation between 
currency crises and local currency-denominated ( dollar denominated) stock market crises 
is 0.40 (0.54); this suggests a higher correlation between currency crises and dollar 
denominated stock market crises than local currency-denominated stock market criseso 
Also, goodness-of-fit statistics showed that the predictive ability of the bivariate probit 
model is higher than the predictive ability of the single equation probit model. 
In order to correct for possible endogeneity bias and to obtain consistent estimates 
of the direct effects between the two crises, we employ a simultaneous equations pro bit 
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model where stock market and currency crises are treated as endogenous variables and 
account for the simultaneous nature of the relationship. 
The results show that a one percentage point increase in the contemporaneous 
probability of a currency crisis raises the probability of a dollar-denominated stock 
market (local currency-dominated stock market) crisis by 0.037 (0.018) percentage points 
(significant at the 1 percent level) and a one percentage point increase in the 
contemporaneous probability of a dollar-denominated stock market (local currency-
dominated stock market) crisis raises the probability of currency crisis by 0.020 (0.014) 
percentage points (significant at the 5 (10) percent level). This is evidence that stock 
market crises should be treated as endogenous in currency crises models and currency 
crises should be treated as endogenous in the stock market crises models and a 
simultaneous equation probit model is the appropriate model. 
Therefore, we conclude that there is contemporaneous relationship between stock 
market and currency crises in emerging market economies, even when controlling for 
endogeneity bias and other explanatory variables. Also, the probability of a currency 
crisis on stock market crisis (0.037) is greater than the probability of a stock market crisis 
on currency crises (0.020). Finally, goodness-of-fit statistics showed that the 
simultaneous equation probit models have more satisfactory forecasting ability than 
single equation and bivariate probit models. 
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Appendix 1. Data Sources 
Most of our data come from the International Financial Statistic CD-ROM 
database. International Financial Corporation's Emerging Market Dataset and Morgan 
Stanley Countries Index provide stock market indexes. Political risk variable data come 
from the International Country Risk Guide. 
Data Construction: 
Inflation rate: Log difference of Consumer Price Index (IFS line 64). 
Inflation rate (t-1) = Log CPI (t-1)-Log (t-2) 
Industrial Production Growth: Log difference oflndustrial Production (IFS line 
66). Industrial Production Growth (t-1) = Log IP (t-1)-Log IP (t-2) 
Portfolio Capital Inflow: Portfolio capital inflow (IFS line 78 bgd) divided by 
market capitalization (IFC). 
Short Term External Debt to Reserves: Liabilities of monetary authorities (IFS 
line 4d) + liabilities of banks (IFS line7bd) + liabilities of other banking institutions (IFS 
line 7fd) divided by non-gold reserves (IFS linelLd). 
Money Supply to Reserves: Money supply (IFS line 34+35) converted to dollars 
(divided by average-period nominal exchange rate IFS line rf) divided by IFS line lLd. 
Current Account to GDP: Current Account (IFS line 76ald) divided by GDP (IFS 
line 99b). 
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Political Stability: the measure on political stability variable data comes from the 
International Country Risk Guide. This variable constructed from several components 
and weighted as: 
a. Government Stability (12) 
b. Socio-Economic Conditions (12) 
C. Investment Profile (12) 
d. Internal Conflict (12) 
e. External Conflict (12) 
f. Corruption (6) 
g. Military in Politics (6) 
h. Religion in Politics ( 6) 
1. Law and Order ( 6) 
j. Ethnic Tension (6) 
k. Democratic Accountability ( 6) 
1. Bureaucracy Quality (4) 
Number in parentheses show maximum weight these component can contribute political 
risk variable. Increase in these components is a sign that political risk decreases. 
Real Exchange Rate Overvaluation: End of period nominal exchange rate (IFS 
line rf) deflated by consumer price index (IFS line 64) to compute real exchange rates. 
To construct the overvaluation measure we use deviations ofreal exchange rates from 
previous 4-quarter moving averages. (The results multiplied by -1 ). Therefore, a positive 
numbers show overvaluations. 
137 
Regional Stock Market Return: International Financial Corporation's Emerging 
Market Dataset and Morgan Stanley Countries Index. In the first step, we constructed 
dollar denominated regional stock market index for each countries. For instance, the 
regional stock market index for Argentina is computed as: Sum of the stock market index 
of Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Peru, Venezuela and Mexico divided by 6 then we take log 
differences of regional stock market indexes to construct regional stock market returns. 
Regional Market Pressure Index: Constructed from individual countries market 
pressure index. For instance, the regional market pressure index for Argentina is the 
average of Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Peru, Venezuela and Mexico's market pressure 
indexes. 
World Output Growth: Weighted average of the U.S., Japan and Germany's GDP. 
IFS line 99b. Physical distance is used as a weight. In first step, we constructed a world 
output for each country. For instance, world output for Argentina constructed as: 
(GDPus I Dus)+ (GDPj I Dj) + (GDPgr I Dgr). US, J and GR are the United States, 
Japan and Germany, respectively and Dus is physical distance between the U.S. and 
Argentina. We take log differences of world output to construct world output returns. 
World Stock Market Return: Weighted average of the U.S., Japan and Germany's 
stocks market index. IFS line 62. Physical distance used as a weight. In first step, we 
constructed a world stock market index for each country. For instance, world stock 
market index for Argentina constructed as: (SMius I Dus)+ (SMij I Dj) + (SMigr I Dgr). 
US, J and GR are the United States, Japan and Germany, respectively and Dus is physical 
distance between the U.S. and Argentina. We take log differences of world stock market 
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